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Abstract. We develop a new class of random-graph models for the statistical esti-
mation of network formation that allow for substantial correlation in links. Various
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to see whether network structure is used to enforce risk-sharing, testing as to whether
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various estimators, which requires proving a new Central Limit Theorem for correlated
random variables.
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1. Introduction
Networks of interactions impact many economic behaviors including: insuring one’s
self (e.g., Cai, deJanvry, and Sadoulet (2015)), to undertaking microfinance (e.g., Baner-
jee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013)), educating one’s self (e.g., Calvo-Armengol,
Patacchini, and Zenou (2009); Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2013)), and to engaging
in criminal behavior (e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996); Patacchini and
Zenou (2008) ). Networks of interactions are also essential to understanding financial
contagions (e.g., Gai and Kapadia (2010); Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014); Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015)), as well as world trade (e.g., Chaney (2016)), inter-
state war (e.g.,Jackson and Nei (2015); Koenig, Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2015)),
and a host of other economic phenomena. As such, the structure that a network takes
has profound consequences - changing the possibility of contagions, the decisions that
people make, and the beliefs that people hold. In addition, to the direct interest in net-
work formation, any analysis of peer effects or social learning must account for network
endogeneity since peoples’ positions in networks are driven by their characteristics (e.g.,
see Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013)). All of these applications make it essential
to understand and be able to estimate network formation.
Moreover, networks are of interest in all such applications precisely because there are
externalities - one agent’s behavior impacts the welfare and behaviors of others.1 This
feature means that connections between pairs of agents are not independent, not only
in determining behaviors but also in network formation. Thus, appropriate models of
network formation must admit correlations in connections.
Despite the importance of network formation in such a wide range of social and eco-
nomic settings, general and flexible econometric models for the estimation of network
formation are lacking. This stems from two challenges: the aforementioned dependence
in connections, and the fact that many studies involve one (large) network. Thus, one
is often confronted with estimating a model of formation by taking advantage of the
large number of connections, but having them all be dependent observations. Despite
the dependence, it is possible that the many relationships in a network still provide rich
enough information to consistently estimate a network model and test of hypotheses
from a single observed network, at least hypothetically. Here we develop a class of mod-
els that admit substantial correlations in links and also provide practical techniques of
1For detailed discussion and references see Jackson, Rogers, and Zenou (2016); Jackson (2017, forth-
coming).
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estimating the models, showing that they are easily estimable even if a researcher only
has one network, as well as in cases with many networks.
Before discussing our approach, let us discuss some of the other approaches that are
available.
1.1. Existing Models of Network Formation. The most basic models are what are
known as ‘stochastic block models’, in which links may depend on node characteris-
tics but are (conditionally) independent of each other. That approach assumes away
correlation between links, and so is not suited for most applications beyond community
detection. In particular, stochastic block models are not an option for estimation in most
economic applications. In fact, in Section 4 we show that our models by incorporating
correlation in links substantially outperform a stochastic block model in matching key
network characteristics, even when the block model admits a rich set of covariates.
Given this void, a literature spanning several disciplines (sociology, statistics, econom-
ics, and computer science) turned to exponential random graph models – henceforth
“ERGMs” – to meet these challenges. ERGMs admit link interdependencies and have
become the workhorse models for estimating network formation.2 However, from the
onset of the use of these models, people realized that the parameter estimates could
be very unstable on all except very small networks. It turns out that these issues of
instability are not simply a software issue: it has been shown that maximum likelihood
and Bayesian estimators of the parameters are not be computationally feasible nor con-
sistent for important classes of such models – effectively the ERGMs that include the
link dependencies of interest – and so parameter estimates cannot be trusted in general
(nor can the standard errors), except in cases in which the models are degenerate. For
details see Bhamidi, Bresler, and Sly (2008); Shalizi and Rinaldo (2012); Chandrasekhar
and Jackson (2012).
A set of models that does allow for link dependencies and are estimable are those
based on explicit link formation algorithms (e.g., Barabasi and Albert (1999); Jackson
and Watts (2001); Jackson and Rogers (2007); Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009, 2010);
Christakis, Fowler, Imbens, and Kalyanaraman (2010); Bramoulle´, Currarini, Jackson,
2These grew from work on what were known as Markov models (e.g., Frank and Strauss (1986)) or
p∗ models (e.g., Wasserman and Pattison (1996)). An alternative approach is to work with regression
models at the link (dyadic) level, but to allow for dependent error terms, as in the “MRQAP” approach
(e.g., see Krackhardt (1988)). That approach, however, is not designed for identifying the incidence of
particular patterns of network relationships that may be implied by various social or economic theories
of the type that we wish to address here.
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Pin, and Rogers (2012)). These models can be estimated since the algorithms are par-
ticular enough so that one can directly derive how parameters in the model translate
into aggregate network statistics, such as the degree distribution or homophily levels.
So, the advantage of such models is that a specific algorithm allows for estimation. The
disadvantage is that the specificity of the algorithms also necessarily results in narrow
models. Thus, these approaches are useful in some contexts, but they are not designed,
nor intended, for general statistical testing of a wide variety of network formation models
and hypotheses. For instance, such models cannot perform a statistical test for triadic
closure (are links correlated across triples of nodes - so that if two people have a friend
in common, are they more likely to be friends with each other than if link formation
were independent).3
Another approach can be thought of as having roots in the spacial econometrics lit-
erature. In such models, nodes only link to other nodes that are close enough in some
geographic or characteristic space, so that links between distant enough pairs of nodes are
asymptotically (at a fast enough rate) independent (e.g., Boucher and Mourifie´ (2012);
Leung (2014)). This approach holds promise for some enormous networks - in which
the graph can almost be decomposed into independent pieces. Another approach views
correlations as driven by unobserved heterogeneity, but has links be uncorrelated condi-
tional on all true (observed and unobserved) characteristics (Graham (2014)). Although
there are still some challenges in taking such models to data, they have taken novel
approaches and should be useful in settings with sufficient (approximate) independence.
Finally, there is a large literature on the theory of network formation from a strate-
gic perspective (for references, see Jackson (2005, 2008))). Since the first writing of
this paper, researchers have started to derive versions of such models that can be taken
to data. One approach builds upon the relationship between certain classes of strate-
gic network formation models and potential games (Mele (2016); Badev (2013); Sheng
(2013)). Another derives restrictions on parameters of an observed network under the
presumption that it is in equilibrium (pairwise stable) (de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and
Tamer (2014)).4 Although the progress to date requires restrictions on how links can
enter agent’s payoffs, they provide important first steps in deriving implications of the
3The Jackson and Rogers (2007) model does have a parameter that affects triadic closure, but in that
model closure cannot be separated from the shape of the degree distribution - so it is best suited for
growing random networks where new nodes are born over time.
4For a recent overview of the recent literature, see de Paula (2015).
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arsenal of strategic network formation models. Below, we also provide ways to incor-
porate strategic formation in SUGMs, thus in part bridging our approach here and the
strategic formation approach.
1.2. Our Subgraph Model Approach. Our approach is quite distinct from all of
the above, both in terms of the fundamentals of the approach (working with subgraphs
as the basic building blocks) and the technicalities of allowing nontrivial conditional
correlations (developing a new central limit theorem for non-trivially correlated random
variables). Our contribution is to develop models of network formation that admit
considerable interdependency, and have the presence of links be highly correlated - even
across distances, but still prove consistency and asymptotic normality of the parameter
estimates.
The paucity of flexible models that are computable and can be used across many
applications for hypothesis testing and inference is what motivates our work here.
What we do is develop a new class of random-graph models for the statistical esti-
mation of network formation that allow for substantial correlation in links. In these
models, various subgraphs (e.g., links, triangles, cliques, stars) are generated directly.
For instance, students may form friendships with their roommate(s), members of a study
group, teammates, band members, etc.; researchers may form collaborations on writing
papers in pairs, or triples, or quadruples, etc. This results in links, and those links are
then naturally correlated since they are formed in combinations. The union of all these
subgraphs results in a network. The challenge to the researcher is that often only the fi-
nal network is observed: a survey may ask people to list their friends and acquaintances,
or links may be observed on a social platform, or emails or phone calls are observed, and
so forth; but the original formation process is often not observed. The challenge that
then arises in estimating how the network formed is that subgraphs may overlap and
may also incidentally generate new subgraphs, and so the true rate of formation of the
subgraphs cannot generally be inferred just by counting their presence in the resulting
network.
Although the basic ideas behind our models are very simple, we provide four different
applications that illustrate how easily such models admit strategic network formation,
general covariates, and generate rich network features.
Despite the fact that the formation can only be inferred, there are fairly simple con-
ditions for identification, as different rates of generation for subgraphs lead to different
observed network characteristics. Effectively, one can estimate the frequencies at which
various subgraphs should appear in the final network based on their formation rate. So,
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we provide estimation techniques for recovering the frequencies at which the underlying
subgraphs were formed from the observation of a single (large) network. We provide re-
sults on identification of the true underlying parameters governing subgraph formation
from various statistics.
Beyond the identification issue, for the models to be useful in hypothesis testing and
inference, we also need to provide results on the asymptotic distributions of the esti-
mates. We provide results for two different approaches, depending on what sort of data
the researcher has available. One approach is for researchers who observe many sepa-
rate networks. Here asymptotics are straightforward since there are many independent
observations. The other approach is for researchers who observe one network. There,
the asymptotics are more technically challenging. In particular, existing central limit
theorems from the spatial and time-series econometrics literatures do not apply to our
setting, as we need to allow subgraphs to form on arbitrary groups of nodes, which then
results in correlation patterns across all links in the network. In particular, the standard
arguments exploiting strong mixing of random variables do not apply since there is no
sense in which the random variables we are concerned with begin to become arbitrarily
far from each other, and therefore essentially uncorrelated. Thus, we use a powerful
lemma from Stein (1986) in order to prove a new central limit theorem for correlated
random variables that provides for more general and permissive results than previously
available for our setting. This establishes asymptotic normality for our estimators, and
should be useful beyond our network setting. They may be of independent interest as
they have a connection to the study of central limit theorems for random variables de-
scribed by dependency graphs (Baldi and Rinott (1989); Goldstein and Rinott (1996);
Chen and Shao (2004)). Finally, we also show that if the network is sparse enough then
direct counts of subgraphs are consistent and asymptotically normal estimators - pro-
viding a very easy estimation technique for many network applications, as many social
and economic networks are relatively sparse.
We conclude the paper with additional illustrative applications and extensions, show-
ing how one can apply the models to cases where the nodes have continuous-valued
characteristics that influence the formation of subgraphs and showing that these models
provide much better fits of some network data than alternative models that ignore the
link correlations.
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2. Model
2.1. Description. n ≥ 3 is the number of nodes on which a network is formed. Nodes
may have characteristics, such as age, profession, gender, race, caste, etc., that we denote
by the vector Xi for a generic i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We denote a network by g, the collection of subsets of {1, . . . , n} of size 2 that lists
the edges or links that are present in its graph. So, g = {{1, 3}, {2, 5}} indicates the
network that has links between nodes 1 and 3 and between nodes 2 and 5. For notational
ease, we simply write g = {13, 25}, and write ij ∈ g to denote that link ij is present
in network g. In general our model easily accommodates directed graphs, and all of the
definitions below extend directly, in which case instead of pairs of nodes, these would
be ordered pairs so that ij and ji would differ. However, for ease of exposition, most of
the examples and discussion refer to the undirected case.
Gn denotes the set of all networks on n nodes.
In a subgraph generation model, henceforth SUGM, subgraphs are directly generated,
and then the resulting network is the union of all of the links in all of the subgraphs.
Degenerate examples of this are Erdos-Renyi random networks, and the generalization of
that model, stochastic-block models, in which links are formed with probabilities based
on nodes’ attributes. The more interesting classes of SUGMs include richer subgraphs,
and hence involve dependencies in link formation. It might be that people of the same
caste meet more frequently or are more likely to form a relationship when they do meet,
as in a stochastic block model, but it could also be that groups of three (or more) meet
and can decide whether to form a triangle, with the meeting probability and decision
potentially driven by their castes and/or other characteristics. The model can then be
described by a list of probabilities, one for each type of subgraph, where subgraphs can
be based on the subgraph shape as well as the nodes’ characteristics.
SUGMs are formally defined as follows.
There are finitely many types of nonempty subgraphs, indexed by ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}, on
which the model is based – for instance in the links and triangles case ` ∈ {L, T}.5 The
k subgraph types are denoted by (G`)`∈{1,...,k}, where each G` ⊂ Gn is a set of possible
subgraphs on m` ≤ n nodes. Each subgraph in g′ ∈ G` is homomorphic to (a relabeling
of) every other g′′ ∈ G`.6 The definitions of the subgraph types can restrictions based on
5This definition does not admit isolates since we define subgraphs to be nonempty and connected, but
isolates are easily admitted with notational complications, and are illustrated in some of our supple-
mentary material and examples.
6So, for any g′, g′′ ∈ Gn` , there exists a bijection pi on {1, . . . , n} such that ij ∈ g′ if and only if
pi(i)pi(j) ∈ g′′.
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node characteristics, for instance, requiring that the characteristics Xi and Xpi(i) be the
same – for instance, G` for some ` could be the set of “triangles that involve one child
and two adult nodes”. As an example, the set G` for some ` could be all stars with one
central node and four other nodes, and another ` could be all of the links that involve
people of different castes, and so forth. These could also be directed subgraphs in the
case of a directed network. A few examples are pictured in Figure 1.
(a) Isolate (b) Link with two types (c) Triangle with a multiplexed link
(d) 4-star with differing types (e) Tree of all blues (f) 4-clique with differing types
Figure 1. Examples of subgraphs. Links could be directed or undirected
or even multiplexed (take on multiple edge types) and nodes can have
different characteristics (denoted by node colors).
The probability that various subgraphs form is described by a vector of parameters,
denoted β ∈ B, where B is (unless otherwise noted) a compact subset of some finite
dimensional Euclidean space.7 For instance, β = (βL, βT ) ∈ B ⊂ [0, 1]2 in a links and
triangles example. In some applications, the parameters have the same dimension as
the number of types of subgraphs, although this is not necessary. For example, the
vector β may include preference parameters of agents who choose to form subgraphs
based on their own and neighbors characteristics and the shape of the subgraph and
some preference parameters (e.g., how much agents like interacting with other agents
who have similar characteristics) may influence the formation of more than one type of
subgraph.
A network g on n nodes is randomly formed as follows:
• Each of the possible subnetworks g` ∈ G` is independently formed with proba-
bility a probability p`(β) for each ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In many of our examples, each
p` is synonymous with the parameter β`.
7We treat vectors as row or column vectors as is convenient in what follows.
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• The resulting network, g, is the union of all the links that appear in any of the
generated subgraphs.
2.2. An Example with Node Characteristics.
To make things very clear, let us consider an example with discrete characteristics.
Suppose that nodes come in two colors: blue and red (for instance different gen-
ders, age groups, religions, etc., and clearly this extends directly to more than two
colors). In our example of links and triangles, there are now three types of links: (blue,
blue), (blue, red), (red, red); and four types of triangles (blue,blue,blue), (blue,blue,red),
(blue,red,red), (red,red,red).
In this case, the set of possible `’s would be: {(blue, blue), (blue, red), (red, red),
(blue,blue,blue), (blue,blue,red), (blue,red,red), (red,red,red)}.
(a) All Links
(b) All Triangles
Figure 2. Panel (A) shows all possible links and Panel (B) shows all
possible triangles when a node has characteristic Xi ∈ {red, blue}.
So we have
G(blue,blue) = {ij : Xi = blue,Xj = blue}
and
G(blue,blue,red) = {ijk : Xi = blue,Xj = blue,Xk = red},
and so forth, as depicted in Figure 2.
The parameters
{β(blue,blue), β(blue,red), β(red,red), β(blue,blue,blue), β(blue,blue,red), β(blue,red,red), β(red,red,red)},
could be the probabilities that the subgraphs in question form.
One could restrict or enrich the model by having simpler or more complex sets of
parameters – for instance requiring that β(blue,blue) = β(red,red), or by having preference
parameters that govern the probabilities of various subgraphs forming, as we discuss
below.
This example is one with a finite set of possible node characteristics. It is also easy to
accommodate continuous node characteristics. For instance, we can let pT (Xi, Xj, Xk; β)
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be the probability of a triangle but be governed by the characteristics of the nodes in a
logistic or probit formulation.
2.3. Usefulness of this Framework. The SUGM perspective is useful for a number
of purposes.
First, it can be used to explore incentives for linking in a reduced form way. There
are many theories, including that of Coleman (1988), as well as game-theoretic models
such as that studied by Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2012), that suggest
that triangles and other cliques play special roles in maintaining cooperation in favor
exchange. In order to test such theories, we need a statistical model that allows us to
test whether cliques appear significantly more often than being randomly generated by
links, and whether they appear in configurations that would be predicted by the game
theory.
Second, simple SUGMs, even ones with just links and triangles, generate higher-
order features of empirically observed social networks that link-based models (even those
accounting for characteristics and geography) do not. It is important for a formation
model to capture realistic features of empirical network data. For example, if a researcher
observes only part of a network, having a reasonable model of network formation is
important to interpolate over the missing data in a sensible way (e.g., see Chandrasekhar
and Lewis (2013)). Or, if one is interested in generating networks under a hypothetical
policy, a model is only is only useful if it can generates networks that are likely to occur
at a variety parameter values.
Third, SUGMs can be used for structural estimation. There are parsimonious micro-
foundations – simple models of mutual consent or search – that give rise to SUGMs.
Structural parameter estimates may have intrinsic value of their own in terms of welfare
analyses, and also help with counterfactuals and policy evaluation.
To illustrate some of these potential uses of SUGMs, we provide several examples
below. We then further develop and estimate SUGMs in the context of each of these
examples in Section 4.
2.4. Example 1: Do incentives for Risk Sharing Drive Network Formation?
Our first example illustrates how SUGMs can be used to ask whether incentives for risk-
and favor-sharing drive network formation.
2.4.1. A model of mutual consent. Consider a simple model in which individuals get
utility from being in bilateral relationships (“links”) denoted by L, as well as trilateral
relationships denoted by T . The value of a partner j to i in a bilateral relationship is
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given by uLi :
uLi (j) = βLX ′ij − ij
and the value of the trilateral set of relationships jk to i is given by uTi :
uTi (jk) = βTX ′ijk − ijk.
The value of the relationships depend on the characteristics of the people involved (for
instance, exhibiting homophily, etc.) via the βLX ′ij and βTX ′ijk terms. There are also
idiosyncratic values to the relationships, −ij and−ijk, which may capture personalities,
compatibilities, etc. These are distributed according to some distributions FL and FT
respectively.
Forming relationships requires mutual consent (e.g., as in the pairwise stability of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)), so the net utility must be positive to all agents. The
probability that a subgraph ij forms is
pL (Xij, βL) = FL
(
βLX
′
ij
)2
and similarly the probability that subgraph ijk forms is
pT (Xijk, βT ) = FT
(
βTX
′
ijk
)3
.
The squares and cubes come from the fact that links require two consents and trilateral
relationships require three consents.
In this case by estimating the probabilities of subgraphs forming (pT (·) and pL (·)),
one can recover the marginal effects of changes in covariates on preferences for being in
various configurations (βT and βL).
2.4.2. Incentives for Risk-Sharing. Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2012) show
that whether or not a link is supported plays an important role in maintaining favor ex-
change. It characterizes renegotiation proof robust pairwise stable networks and shows
that, in the homogenous parameter case all such networks are quilts, and in the in-
homogenous parameter case every link must be supported. Of course, the model of
Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2012) is not meant to be taken literally and
doesn’t lend itself to a simple econometric framework.
Consider a variation on the aforementioned mutual consent model wherein now there
are multiple link types: favors and information, and for simplicity we do not consider
the interaction of these links. We can use this to study the question raised by Jackson,
Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2012). To make this simple assume there are no covari-
ates, so all nodes are identical. Preferences are described by a random utility framework
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(McFadden, 1973). In this case the value of a link between i and j to i is given by
uL,favori (i) = βL,favor − ij,favor, uL,infoi (i) = βL,info − ij,info
and the value of a triangle is given by
uT,favori (jk) = βT,favor − ijk,favor, uT,infoi (jk) = βT,info − ijk,info.
By the arguments of Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2012), we expect that
fraction of links that are supported should be higher in favor exchange than in informa-
tion links. In the language of this model, one expects that βT,favor
βL,favor
>
βT,info
βL,info
.
Given that triangles can be incidentally generated, one cannot test this simply by
examining the ratio of supported links to unsupported ones. If βL,info was very high,
then it could be that there are many incidentally generated information triangles, and
fewer links remain unsupported. By estimating a link and triangle SUGM, one can
estimate the parameters and test this hypothesis, as we do in Section 4.2.
2.5. Example 2: Matching Empirical Network Data.
2.5.1. SUGMs Match Non-Modeled Features of Observed Networks. A challenge for net-
work formation models has been to capture more than one or two observed features of
social networks at a time.
For instance, many observed social networks are sparse but clustered, which motivates
developing models that reflect this (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). They also have a vari-
ety of differing degree distributions ((Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Jackson and Rogers,
2007) and exhibit high levels of homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001;
Currarini, Jackson, and Pin, 2009, 2010), which can lead to poverty traps and differ-
ences in employment between races (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2007). There are also
features such as the expansion properties of a network that are described by maximal
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix speaks to the speed of a diffusion process on the
network (Bollobas (2001)). The depth of the max flow min cut speaks to several things
such as consensus time in a social learning process Golub and Jackson (2012) as well as
the degree of cooperation sustainable (Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Szeidl, 2009).
We show below that a simple links and triangles SUGM that only has four parame-
ters (estimated from our data) captures a number of these features all within a simple
model: average distance, the maximal eigenvalue, the cut (homophily), clustering, de-
grees, among other things) and does so better than a conditional edge independent
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model (a block model) with numerous parameters that can flexibly depend on a rich set
of covariates.
2.5.2. Completing Network Data. Network data can be expensive to collect, and so many
data sets are only subsamples of a network. A simple way to proceed is to use such a
sampled network to estimate the network formation parameters. This can then be
applied to a predict the features that the network must exhibit on the full population.
As just mentioned, SUGMs are particularly well suited for this since they replicate many
higher order features of network structure that are not captured by other methods.
2.6. Example 3: The Impact of Microfinance. In some cases, we are interested in
testing how networks change in response to some change in the setting. As an example,
we wish to know how the introduction of microfinance changes network structure, and
not only how this affects people who end up with formal loans, but also among those
who do not.
Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2016) examine the introduction of mi-
crofinance to 43 out of 75 villages - and based on network surveys before and after the
microfinance introduction. This allows one to do a diff-n-diff analysis of the networks.
SUGMs are particularly relevant since we wish to estimate not only how this affects
links, but also how it affects triangles (supported relationships) and other features of
the network. Moreover, we need to see how this varies with demographics. In particular,
households vary in their appetite and eligibility for microfinance. We can distinguish
(at least) two types of households in a village:those that are likely to join microfinance
if available and those that are not. A SUGM helps us identify the effects that microfi-
nance has on the overall social network structure in a society and break that down by
relationship type and household characteristics.
By estimating changes in SUGMs in villages where microfinance is introduced and
comparing those changes to villages in which microfinance was not introduced, we can
test these hypotheses.
2.7. Example 4: Links across Social Boundaries. Our final example shows how a
SUGM can be used to investigate whether there are norms govern link-formation across
different social groups. Identities can lead to strong social norms – prescriptions and
proscriptions – concerning interactions across groups. For instance, in much of India
there are strong forces that influence if and when individuals can form relationships
across castes. Are people significantly more likely to form cross-caste relationships when
those links are unsupported (without any friends in common) compared to when those
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links are supported with at least one friend in common (and thus have a witness to the
relationship)? To answer this we need models that account for link dependencies, as
cliques of three or more may exhibit greater adherence to a group norm prohibiting cer-
tain inter-caste relationships, while the norm may be circumvented in isolated bilateral
relationships.
We can test whether the relative frequency of triangles compared to links is higher
when the relationships are all within caste than across caste.
2.8. Links and Triangles as Our Leading Example. The bulk of our discussion
has focused on (and will continue to focus on) a variety of link and triangle SUGMs,
though other subgraphs can be included and are covered by our general results. Our
exposition focuses on links and triangles for two main reasons: first, this case is simple
to understand and illustrates all of the main points since it exhibits correlated links and
incidental generation, second, the link and triangle model already matches most all of
the moments that a researcher is generally interested and thus should be sufficient for
most research projects.
We leave any further specification of the particulars of a model to the researcher as
it will depend on their context and the phenomenon being modeled. In practice if a
key concern is modeling sparse networks that are clustered, a links and triangle model,
generally with covariates, will do the heavy lifting. But if there are other the types of
subgraphs that are hypothesized to arise in some particular context, then that model
can be constructed and estimated in the ways outlined in our approach and some of our
general results.
The selection of subgraphs in a data-driven is also possible, but formalizing that is left
as the subject of future research. Intuitively one can imagine positing a nested sequence
of models wherein a point in the parameter space rejects the need for adding a higher
order subgraph.
3. Identification and Estimation
3.1. The Challenge. The researcher’s goal is to use the observed data to recover the
parameters of interest, for example, the (βL, βT ) in a SUGM of links and triangles. If the
researcher observed the links and triangles that were formed directly, then estimation
would be straightforward. Indeed, in some instances a researcher might have information
on all the various groups a given individual is involved in: for instance in the case of a co-
authorship network, the researcher may observe all the papers a researcher has written
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and thus observes papers with two authors, three authors, and so forth. Instead, for
instance, it may be that there are groups of three people who commonly share favors
and risks together - who really form a triangle, but the researcher only has information
from a survey asking which pairs of agents are ‘friends’ based a survey (as in networks
derived from the Add Health data set as in Currarini et al. (2009)), or who borrows
from whom and who lends kerosene and rice to whom and other bilateral nominations
(as in our Indian village data Banerjee et al. (2013)), or from observing that they are
friends on a social platform (as in Facebook network data as in Bailey et al. (2016)), or
from observing that two people phone each other or remit payments to each other (as
in many Phone data sets Blumenstock et al. (2011)).
Thus, the general problem is that the formation of the subgraphs is not directly
observed, and so must be inferred in order to estimate the parameters of interest. From
the perspective of the researcher, the observed network g is a projection of L and T .
For example, if
gijgjkgik = 1,
is it the case that ijk formed as a triangle, or that ij, jk and ik formed as links, or that
ij and jk formed as links and ik formed as part of a different triangle ikm, or some
combination of these or other combinations?
Figure 3 provides an illustration.
This presents a challenge for estimating a parameter related to triangle formation since
some of the observed triangles were directly generated in the formation process, and
others were “incidentally generated;” and similarly, it presents a challenge to estimating
a parameter for link formation since some truly generated links end up as parts of
triangles. It could also be that the link 12 formed directly or as part of the triangle
124 or both. This would not be observed either, and so we face several challenges in
estimating the number of directly generated links.8
Despite this challenge, the model parameters can generally be identified, as we prove
below. For instance, as the probabilities of links and triangles vary so do the properties
of the expected networks, and by looking at a large enough network, one can consistently
recover the parameters of interest. To understand how, note that as one varies βL, βT ,
the relative rates of overall observed links and triangles change, as do the number of
triangles that overlap with each other. One can calculate the relative rates at which
incidental links and triangles are expected to be generated, and there is an invertible
relationship between observed counts of links and triangles, and the underlying rates
8One could view this as an issue of measurement error with correlation.
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(a) n nodes (b) Triangles form
(c) Links form (d) Resulting network
Figure 3. The network that is formed and eventually observed is shown
in panel D. The process comes from forming triangles independently with
probability βT as in (B) in red; and also forming links, in grey, indepen-
dently with probability βL as in (C). New links are dashed while links that
overlap with some link also formed in a triangle are in solid and bold. We
see that there is both (i) overlap as some links coincide with links already
in triangles, as well as (ii) extra triangles that were generated ‘inciden-
tally’. Given that we only observe the resulting network in panel D, we
need to infer the formation of the different subgraphs carefully and not
simply by directly counting observed links and triangles.
at which they were expected to be directly formed. Moreover, this can be done via
estimators that are easily computed. In addition, as we show later, these have nice
asymptotic normality properties despite the fact that the links are all correlated. Thus,
beyond the identification problem, we also prove a new central limit theorem for cor-
related random variables that could be correlated in ways that do not satisfy standard
mixing assumptions used in time series or spatial econometrics.
3.2. Identification. To keep the discussion uncluttered suppose that p`(β) = β`, and
we consider SUGMs with a list of k subgraphs.
Let S (g) = (S1(g), ..., SK(g)) be a vector of statistics of the graph used to identify
the parameters of interest, where K ≥ k.
In terms of estimation, writing out an analytic expression for the probability of ob-
serving S (g) as a function of β in the general case can be challenging (we offer these
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functions for links and triangles, and links and stars, below). One way to estimate the
parameter is via GMM (generalized method of moments).
To estimate β by GMM define the objective function
Q̂ (β) = (S (g)− Eβ [S (g)]) (S (g)− Eβ [S (g)])′
and then estimate of the parameters, denoted β̂, solves the equation:
(3.1) E
β̂
[S (g)] = S (g) .
The notation here suggests a setting in which a researcher observes a single large
network, as is often the case. In some case, as we discuss in Sections 5.2 and 5, a
researcher has R networks. In that case g = (g1, ..., gR) and S(g) = 1R
∑
r S(gr) is the
empirical average. Our argument for identification presented here does not depend on
the data frame (single large network or many independent networks) because what is
crucial is whether β 6= β′ implies Eβ [S(g)] 6= Eβ′ [S(g)]. Also, note that because our
model is parametric, we can compute the finite sample distribution and thus the finite
sample bias of the estimator (and so correct for it).
For identification we need to show that
β 6= β′ =⇒ Eβ [S (g)] 6= Eβ′ [S (g)] .
We now show that given a collection of subgraphs that comprise a SUGM, there is
a natural set of network statistics based on counting subgraphs identifies the SUGM
parameters.
In particular, order subgraph types so that the number of links9 a subgraph of type `
is nondecreasing in `. Let S`(g) is the fraction of subgraph of type G` that are present
out of the total possible. Let N`(g)sub−only be the number of instances where there is a
situation in which there could exist a particular instance of subnetwork g` ∈ G`, then
in g ∪ g` the instance g` could only been generated only subgraphs of type `′ ≤ `. Let
S`(g)sub−only is the fraction of instances out of N`(g)sub−only in which the subgraph g` is
actually present in g. So, for links and triangles, NL(g)sub−only is the number of pairs
of nodes that have no common neighbors in g, and SL(g)sub−only fraction of times that
there is a link between those two nodes. For ` = k, Sk(g)sub−only = Sk(g), since there
are no larger subnetworks. Consider the “subgraph-only counts”:
S (g)sub−only = (S1 (g)sub−only , ..., Sk−1 (g)sub−only , Sk(g)sub−only),
where for k note that Sk(g)sub−only = Sk(g).
9In the case of multiplexing, count the total number of relationships present in the subgraph.
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Proposition 1. [Identification via Subgraph Counts] Every SUGM is identified. That
is, for any collection of subgraphs (G`)`∈{1,...,k} on n nodes, the vector of subgraph-only
counts, S(g)sub−only, satisfies:
β 6= β′ =⇒ Eβ
[
S (g)sub−only
]
6= Eβ′
[
S (g)sub−only
]
.
We now elaborate on two examples, to make this general result clear and to provide
some other identification techniques that can also be useful. The first example concerns
links and triangles. We look at this model in three ways: without covariates, with
covariates, and with multiplexing (where edges are not binary but can take on assorted
values). The second example is a model of links and Z-stars.
3.3. Links and Triangles.
3.3.1. Without Covariates. We begin with the simplest case where there are no covari-
ates. We begin with the simple case when there are no covariates. It is useful to define
by UP (g) the set of pairs of nodes that have no common neighbors in g (UP for “un-
supported pairs of nodes”).
Here
SL (g)sub−only :=
∑
i<j,(ij)∈UP (g) gij
|UP (g)| ,
as the share of links in the subnetwork excluding all existing triangles, and
ST (g)sub−only = ST (g) =
∑
i<j<k gijgjkgik(
n
3
) .
For the case of links and triangles, note that the expectation of SL(g)sub−only is the
expected fraction of links present among pairs of nodes that do not have any common
neighbors. This is precisely βL, and so identifies that parameter. In particular,
Eβ[SL(g)sub−only] = Eβ
[
βLNL(g)sub−only
NL(g)sub−only
]
= βL.
Thus, we identify the link parameter from this statistic. If the link parameter has not
changed, then only the triangle parameter has changed and then it follows directly that
the expectation of ST (g) must change. The proof for the general case is a direct extension
of this logic.
Corollary 1. A SUGM of links and triangles is identified with moments S(g) =
(Ssub−onlyL (g), ST (g)) for any β = (βL, βT ) ∈ (0, 1)2. That is, if (β′L, β′T ) 6= (βL, βT ) then
Eβ′ [S (g)] 6= Eβ [S (g)].
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3.3.2. Links and Triangles With Covariates. We describe how identification works with
covariates. We take the support of X to be finite, but the identification extends to
continuous covariates.10
In this case, for every pair of node types a, b note that links cannot be generated by
other links. Thus, all of the sub only counts are direct to calculate for links:
SL,ab(g)sub−only =
∑
i<j,(Xi,Xj)∈{(a,b),(b,a)} gij (1−maxh6=i,j[gihgjh])∑
i<j,(Xi,Xj)∈{(a,b),(b,a)} (1−maxh6=i,j[gihgjh])
.
The expression (1−maxh6=i,j[gihgjh]) is 1 if and only if the pair of nodes have no common
neighbors, and so if there were to be a link between i, j it could only come directly.
Triangles can be incidentally generated by other triangles, so here we have to be exact
in following the sub-only definitions for triangles. To illustrate the definitions, let us
consider the case in which Xi ∈ {blue, red}. So, the triangles are (blue, blue, blue),
(blue, blue, red), (blue, red, red), (red, red, red), and let us follow this order in ordering
our triangles. Then,
ST,(blue,blue,blue)(g)sub−only =
∑
i<j<k,Xi,Xj ,Xj=blue gijgjkgik (1−maxh6=i,j,k;Xh=red[max(gihgjh, gihgkh, gkhgjh)])∑
i<j<k,Xi,Xj ,Xj=blue (1−maxh6=i,j,k;Xh=red[max(gihgjh, gihgkh, gkhgjh)])
.
So, for the all-blue triangles, our base set of nodes on which we count our share of
triangles that are present is out of triples of blues which if connected could only have
been generated by all-blue links or triangles. In this case, that means that no pair of
the three blues can have a red neighbor in common (here noting that the only incidental
generation involving other types of triangles would have to be a (blue, blue, red) triangle
generating one of the blue-blue edges in the triangle here).
Next, then for the (blue, blue, red) case, the triples of nodes that we consider are those
for neither of the blue,red pairs has a red neighbor in common - but now it is ok for the
two blues to have a red neighbor in common since that is the case in consideration.
Then for the (blue, red, red) case, we can consider all triples of such nodes for which
the two reds don’t have a red neighbor in common.
Finally, for the all red case, we consider all such triples since that is the last subgraph
in our sequence.
Corollary 2. A SUGM of links and triangles with covariates is identified by moments
S(g)sub−only =
(
SL,ab(g)sub−only, ST,abc(g)sub−only
)
a≤b≤c for any β =
(
(βL,ab)a≤b , (βT,abc)a≤b≤c
)
.
That is, if β 6= β′ then Eβ′
[
S (g)sub−only
]
6= Eβ
[
S (g)sub−only
]
.
10We can still estimate the probability of links based on parameters from unsupported link counts out
of unsupported pairs, now simply tracking those rates as a function of the covariates. The link function
is then estimated. Then triangles are done conditional on having identified link parameters.
A NETWORK FORMATION MODEL BASED ON SUBGRAPHS 19
3.3.3. Multiplexing. In this example we show that the same results from above hold
even if the network is a multigraph. For example, if households can have information-
sharing links, risk-sharing links, and/or social links, there could be 8 different sorts of
observations that could occur between two nodes, as they might have no relation, exactly
one relation (three different types), exactly two relations (three different ways), or all
three relations.
In saving notation, let us ignore triangles and consider a situation in which we have
info and favor relationships. So, ij could have an info link, a favor link, neither, or
both. Here, our g is extended to track two networks ginfo and gfavor.
There are many reasons to believe that combinations of information and favor links
would not be independent, and so there are three parameters of interest βinfo, βfavor and
βinfo−favor, where it could be that info and favor links happen to form independently, or
they might be generated as a pair. So, even without triangles, this already has correlated
observations and incidental generation.
Nonetheless, we can still think of this in terms of subgraphs. Here, the count statistics
are easy to see. One would count info links that have no favor links out of pairs of nodes
that have no favor links, and one would do the same in reverse, and then count the
overall fraction in which both are present.
Extending this to triangles is then straightforward. One would first examine links
in the order we described. Next, one would examine triangles consisting of just one
relationship on each edge, then triangles in which some edge has two relationships, and
so forth growing upward in the number of links.
For example, in terms of Figure 4, one such ordering would start at the bottom left
and proceed to the right, then go up and order triangles in the each row from left to
right and then keep going upward. At each step, the counting would follow exactly the
procedures described above for links and then similarly in defining triples of nodes for
which if a triangle in question were present it could not have been generated incidentally
by an set of subgraphs including a triangle further to the right or above it in the figure.
Corollary 3. A SUGM of links and triangles with multiplexing is identified by mo-
ments S(g)sub−only. That is, if β 6= β′ then Eβ′
[
S (g)sub−only
]
6= Eβ
[
S (g)sub−only
]
.
3.3.4. Identification With Straight Link and Triangle Counts. For a links and triangles
SUGM, identification can be also be achieved using only S(g) = (SL(g), ST (g)) instead
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(a) All Triangles
(b) All Links
Figure 4. Panel (A) shows all possible links and Panel (B) shows all
possible triangles when a edges can either be blue, red or both (double
line, purple).
of the sub-only counts, which is slightly easier to code for use in empirical work (and
the moment SL(g) will generally have more observations than SL (g)sub−only). We now
show this. This result on identification is much harder to prove and does not directly
generalize.
To understand the source of identification here, consider Figure 5. Each configuration
involves two triangles, but the bottom one with only five links is relatively more easily
incidentally formed than the upper one. Thus, by looking at the combination of how
many triangles and how likely links there are, we can sort out relative rates of the two
parameters.
(a) Node adjacent triangles (b) Edge adjacent triangles
Figure 5. Two different configurations of two triangles - one has a count
of 6 total links and the other has a count of 5 links. (A) is more relatively
more likely to come directly from the formation of two triangles, and (B)
is relatively more likely to come from a combination of links and triangles.
The likelihoods of links and triangles can thus be deduced via careful
deductions from the combination of the counts of links and triangles.
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Proposition 2. A SUGM of links and triangles is identified with moments S(g) =
(SL(g), ST (g)) for any β = (βL, βT ) ∈ (0, 1)2. That is, if (β′L, β′T ) 6= (βL, βT ) then
Eβ′ [S (g)] 6= Eβ [S (g)].
Let us outline the basic ideas behind the proof, with the full proof appearing in the
appendix.
Let q˜L denote the probability that a link forms conditional upon exactly one particular
triangle that it could be a part of not forming. For instance, for nodes ij it is the
probability that ij is formed either as a link or as part of a triangle that is not triangle
hij for some other node h. In this case:
(3.2) EβL,βT [SL(g), ST (g)] =
[
βT + (1− βT )q˜L, βT + (1− βT )(q˜L)3
]
.
For instance, note that the term βT + (1 − βT )(q˜L)3 is the probability that a triangle
forms, either directly (βT ), or does not form directly (1 − βT ) but then each of the
links then forms on its own (q˜L)3.11 The term for the links is similar as it could form if
some particular triangle forms, or else if that triangle does not form then it forms with
probability q˜L. Although there are more direct ways to write the probability of a link
forming, this particular expression is useful in the proof since it is easy to compare it
to and this distinguish it from the triangle expression, as they are identical except for
the exponent. This is very helpful in showing how different parameters lead to different
rates of formation of links and triangles since we can isolate the difference via the q˜L
versus (q˜L)3 expressions.
Analogs of this proposition extend to cases with covariates and multiplexing, simply
with more complicated extensions of (3.2) accounting for the specific types of triangles
or links needed to incidentally generate any given link or part of a triangle.
3.4. Links and Stars. Our second example is a model where a link forms with prob-
ability βL and a star (with some number of links z > 1) with probability βStar. We
consider the case without covariates or multiplexing for simplicity.
Here, when we count links in the sub-only, we have to count them out of all pairs of
nodes that if they did have a link would not be involved in a star. Thus, these are pairs
of nodes ij for which both i and j have degree not counting gij that is less than z − 1.
11Conditional upon the triangle not forming directly, the links are then independent.
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Let di(g \ j) = ∑h6=j,i gih be the degree of i in g excluding node j. So,
SL (g)sub−only =
∑
i<j,di(g\j)<z−1,di(g\j)<z−1 gij∑
i<j,di(g\j)<z−1,di(g\j)<z−1 1
,
and
Sstar (g)sub−only = Sstar (g) =
∑
i:di(g)≥z
(
di(g)
z
)
n
(
n−1
z
)
as the share of z-stars in the network.
Corollary 4. A SUGM of links and z-stars is identified by S(g)sub−only = (SL(g)sub−only, Sstar(g)).
That is, if β′ 6= β, then Eβ′ [S (g)] 6= Eβ [S (g)].
(a) Observed Network
C C
(b) 5-stars highlighted in red, centers denoted
Figure 6. An example of a link and 5-star model on n = 11 nodes. Here
there are two 5-stars in the network, and either or both could have been
generated incidentally by links, and also they generate incidental links.
The link parameter is identified from the links not in the stars (the black
nodes in panel (B)) counted relative to pairs of nodes which if connected
would still not be part of a star. Once the link parameter is identified,
then the star parameter is identified by the share of stars present, at that
expected share is a function of the link and star parameters with an already
identified link parameter.
There are also other moments that can be used to identify parameters from a links
and z-stars SUGM as we discuss in Appendix B.
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4. Applications
We now apply our model to study the four examples from Section 2 to illustrate the
kinds of questions SUGMs can be used to addressed. Though slightly unorthodox, we
defer the presentation of the asymptotic framework and the demonstration that the
estimator for the parameters is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed in
Section 5, after showcasing several applications of SUGMs.
4.1. Data. We use the Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013, 2014) data
consisting of a variety of social and economic networks from 75 Indian villages as well as
detailed demographic background.12 Having 75 villages worth of data allows us to show
not only how the model scales with the number of nodes, but also with the number of
networks observed.
The networks have households as nodes. There are an average of 220 households per
village. We surveyed adults, asking them about a variety of their daily interactions,
as well as their demographics (caste, education, profession, religion, family size, wealth
variables, voting and ration cards, self-help group participation, savings behavior, etc.).
We have network data from 89.14 percent of the 16,476 households based on interviews
with 65 percent of all adults between the ages of 18 and 55.13 We have data concerning
twelve types of interactions: (1) whose houses he or she visits, (2) who visits his or her
house, (3) his or her relatives in the village, (4) non-relatives who socialize with him or
her, (5) who gives him or her medical help, (6) from whom he or she borrows money,
(7) to whom he or she lends money, (8) from whom he or she borrows material goods
(e.g., kerosene, rice), (9) to whom he or she lends material goods, (10) from whom he
or she gets important advice, (11) to whom he or she gives advice, (12) with whom he
or she goes to pray (e.g., at a temple, church or mosque).
The answers are aggregated to the household level, but one can also work with the
individual-level networks to get very similar results as those presented below. How a link
is defined varies based on the application. We use undirected,14 unweighted networks
that may allow for multiplexing.
For much of what follows, we work with the borrowing and lending of material goods
(questions 8 and 9, with any positive answer indicating a link being present) that we
12See Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013) for more information about the data.
13 This is a new wave of data relative to our original microfinance study that includes more surveys.
14Some links are not reciprocated, but that is true at similar rates for the questions regarding relatives as
compared to the other questions, and so much of the failure of reciprocation may simply be measurement
error rather than true one-way relationships. For our purposes here, which are purely to illustrate the
ability of the models to work with data, this distinction is inconsequential.
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call “favor” links, and the exchange of advice (questions 10 and 11, with any positive
answer indicating a link being present) that we call “info” links.
4.2. Example 1 (cont.): Do incentives for risk sharing drive network forma-
tion? Continuing Example 1 from Section 2.4, we test whether supported relationships
are significantly more likely to appear in favor exchange than informational links. The
(joint) hypothesis that we are testing is that exchanging material goods is more costly
and/or happens less frequently for agents, and so requires more incentives and support-
ing enforcement than exchanging information which is less costly and/or more frequent.
To keep the illustration in this first example clear, we abstract from covariates. We
illustrate the incorporation of covariates in the examples below.
Thus, from Section 2.4, we know that pT,favor = F (βT,favor)3 and pL,favor = F (βL,favor)2,
and similarly for information. Without loss of generality, we renormalize things so that
F (β) = β in each case, as the precise scaling of the parameters is irrelevant to the overall
question.
Thus, the test of whether βT,favor
βL,favor
>
βT,info
βL,info
corresponds to
pT,favor/p
3/2
L,favor
pT,info/p
3/2
L,info
> 1.
This test takes into account that there are more consents for a group than a pair (the
3/2), and is also robust to information links simply being more or less valuable, as it
adjusts by relative link prevalence.
Note that the pT and pL are not the realized frequencies of links and triangles, as
those involve incidentally formed instances, so we need to work from our identification
theorem to infer these probabilities.
Table 1. Parameter estimates by network type
p̂L p̂T
Information 0.0123 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.00002)
Favors 0.0088 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.00002)
Notes: Standard errors computed by
nonparametric bootstrapping with re-
placement 75 networks.
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We estimate the four parameters in question under the assumption that all villages
in our sample are independent network generated from the same common parameter
values. Table 1 presents the parameter estimates and standard errors.
We reject the hypothesis that there is no difference in the support of favor relation-
ships compared to information relationships (p = 0.0146).15 We conclude that the data
are consistent with the theory that incentives for favor exchange matters in network
formation in these data.
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Figure 7. Plots of estimates of pT,favor
pT,info
against p
3/2
L,favor
p
3/2
L,info
by village.
While in the above we have taken all villages to be generated from a common param-
eter, we can also push this further by estimating p̂L and p̂T separately for each village,
allowing for underlying heterogeneity in the parameters across villages, but with large
numbers of nodes, we can consistently estimate the parameters per network. We see the
results in Figure 7, though standard errors are omitted for visual clarity. We see that
for most villages, the favor over info ratios are higher for triangles compared to links.
4.3. Example 2 (cont.): Matching Features of Empirical Network Data. Revis-
iting the example from Section 2.5, we compare a standard ‘stochastic block’ model that
15Specifically, the p-value is computed for a test of the null hypothesis pT,favorpT,info =
p
3/2
L,favor
p
3/2
L,info
, where the
parameters are held to be common across all villages in the sample. See Section 5.1 for a justification.
A NETWORK FORMATION MODEL BASED ON SUBGRAPHS 26
estimates linking probabilities based on node characteristics – here caste and geography
– to a SUGM based on links and triangles.
The idea is to compare how well each of these models replicates various features of
empirically observed networks, including many characteristics that are not directly in
the model such as clustering, the size of the giant component, average path length, and
various eigenvalue properties of the adjacency matrices (the largest eigenvalue, and an
eigenvalue measure of homophily.
Beyond average degree and clustering (which turn out to be well-captured by links and
triangles), we are interested whether a very basic SUGM does a good job of replicating
observed networks in terms of characteristics other than those that involve link and tri-
angle counts. We look at the first eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, which is a measure
of diffusiveness of a network under a percolation process (e.g., Bolloba´s, Borgs, Chayes,
and Riordan (2010); Jackson (2008)). This is intimately related to the expansiveness of
the network – namely, for any subset of nodes the number of links leaving the subset
relative to the number of links within the subset. We are also interested in the second
eigenvalue of the stochasticized adjacency matrix.16 This is a quantity that is key in lo-
cal average learning processes and modulates the time to consensus (DeMarzo, Vayanos,
and Zwiebel (2003); Golub and Jackson (2012)), but is also closely related to homophily
(Golub and Jackson (2012)) and is labeled as such in the table below. Additionally, we
look at the fraction of nodes that belong to the giant component of the network, as well
as the number of isolates, as empirical networks are often not completely connected.
Finally, we also consider average path length (in the largest component).
Again, we present the results for favor and info networks. These networks are reason-
ably connected (with more than ninety percent of the nodes being in a giant component)
and yet also reasonably sparse for small networks.
Our procedure is as follows. For every village, we estimate three network formation
models. One network formation model is a link-based model (stochastic block model) in
which the probabilities can depend on geographic distance, caste, the number of rooms
households have, number of beds, quality of electricity provision, quality of latrines,
household ownership status, and squared differences in non-binary variables. The prob-
abilities are estimated using logistic regression. The other two network formation models
are SUGMs. One is a the basic SUGM with links and triangles. Pairs of household are
categorized as either being “close” or “far,” where “close” refers to pairs of nodes that
16The stochasticized adjacency matrix T is defined as Tij = gij∑
k
gik
, where either gii = 1, or gik > 0 for
some k 6= i, as this captures the set of people to whom i listens.
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are of the same caste and “far” to those that differ in caste. Similarly, we categorize
triangles as being “close” if all nodes are of the same caste and “far” otherwise. We allow
for four parameters, close and far link parameters and close and far triangle parameters.
The other model is a slightly richer SUGM in which we allow some nodes to be isolates.
To make the strongest point, we compare very stark SUGMs that use only caste
variables to account for homophily, to a very rich block model that can incorporate a
large set of covariates – including much richer demographics that are usually available
to a researcher. We show that even though we have considerably more information
on the nodes, such as geographic distance and demographic characteristics, and we do
not make use of this information for the SUGMs they recreate networks much more
accurately than a link-based model that does takes advantage of a rich set of node
characteristics. Adding over 12 parameters to the block model to flexibly control for
demographic attributes makes almost no difference in generating network characteristics
that match the observed data, providing very small improvements, and still not coming
close to doing as well as the simple SUGMs. Moreover, since the specification developed
here makes use of considerably richer data than those used in the two candidate SUGM
models, it suggests that by decomposing a network into a tapestry of random structures
(triangles, links, and even isolates), considerable value is added in modeling higher order
features of networks in a parsimonious way.
We estimate parameters for the village network for each model and then generate
random network from each model based on the estimated parameters. We do 100 such
simulations for each of the 75 village and for each of the models. We then compare the
true network characteristics with those from the simulations.
The networks simulated from the SUGMs better match the structural properties ex-
hibited by the empirical Indian village networks than those simulated from a link-based
(stochastic block) model. Figure 8 presents the estimated network statistics under the
various models as well as the true values, village-by-village.
Both of the SUGMs substantially outperform the block model on matching the various
features of the networks. Including isolates in the SUGM further improves the fits
not only for isolates, but also for fraction in the giant component and the maximum
eigenvalue. This suggests that there are more isolated households in a village for a
reason outside of randomness in network formation.
The most obvious thing to note is that the link-based model does extremely poorly
when it comes to matching clustering while the SUGM does much better, which is
natural given that the SUGM includes triangles. More interestingly, conditioning on the
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Table 2. Network Properties
Truth Links/Triangles SUGM Links/Tri/Isolates SUGM Block Model
Panel A: Information (1) (2) (3) (4)
Degree 8.096 8.076 8.042 8.815
(0.261) (0.263) (0.255) (0.311)
Clustering 0.220 0.159 0.147 0.051
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Isolates 10.972 3.503 13.787 0.499
(0.841) (0.408) (0.998) (0.092)
% in Giant 0.950 0.984 0.938 0.998
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
Maximal Eigenvalue 11.914 10.453 10.816 10.374
(0.374) (0.301) (0.300) (0.321)
Homophily 0.887 0.815 0.804 0.686
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Average Path Length 3.027 2.957 2.871 2.758
(0.048) (0.043) (0.040) (0.040)
607.606 607.606 607.606 607.606
Panel B:Favors 64.472 64.472 64.472 64.472
Degree 7.058 7.037 7.087 7.756
(0.261) (0.261) (0.267) (0.324)
Clustering 0.289 0.190 0.176 0.047
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Isolates 10.070 7.558 16.094 1.063
(0.767) (0.748) (1.177) (0.142)
% in Giant 0.951 0.962 0.925 0.995
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
Maximal Eigenvalue 10.065 9.618 9.991 9.479
(0.334) (0.311) (0.323) (0.339)
Homophily 0.941 0.873 0.863 0.733
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Average Path Length 3.516 3.166 3.080 2.915
(0.066) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044)
Notes: Average value of various network statistics for the information and favor networks across 75 villages are shown 
in Column 1. Columns 2-4 present the average values across the 75 villages with 500 simulations per village generated 
from the estimated parameter value for each model specified. Standard errors for the means in parentheses.
triangles in the SUGM is enough to deliver better matches on all of the other dimensions,
and the difference on homophily is perhaps most interesting, since one would imagine
that the block model could get that right given that it includes many covariates. This
tells us that triangles and correlation between links play an important role in homophily
– something that is better picked up by a SUGM than an independent link model with
rich demographics.
Again we emphasize that we have over 12 parameters to flexibly control for demo-
graphic attributes in the dyadic regression whereas the SUGM specifications are ex-
tremely low dimension: with either four parameters in the links and triangles case or
five parameters in the links, triangles, and isolates case. So even though the dyadic
regression uses of considerably richer data than those used in the two candidate SUGM
models, it suggests that by decomposing a network into a tapestry of random structures
(triangles, links and even isolates), considerable value is added in modeling higher order
features of networks in a parsimonious way.
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Figure 8. Each panel shows the expected values of six network statis-
tics question generated across 100 simulations at the estimated parameter
value for each of the 75 village networks. Panel A presents results for the
information network and panel B for the favors network.
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That SUGMs do a much better job at recreating network structures that standard link-
based models, especially with rich demographic information, is important. Moreover,
the fact that the SUGMs do a better job than a link-based model of recreating not only
local clustering and triangle patterns but also many other features of the real networks
that it is not based upon, suggests that there is substantial value added of modeling the
formation of triangles and isolates. Finally, knowing that our model is better able to
capture the realistic correlation of links within observed networks should make us more
confident in trusting the results of the other empirical applications. For example, when
we look at links across social boundaries, we can be comfortable that to first order,
thinking about a SUGM with links and triangles across and within caste groups is a
reasonable cut of the data.
4.4. Example 3 (cont.): Impact of the Introduction of Microfinance. The point
of the next example is to illustrate that there are other microfoundations beyond mutual
consent models that motivate SUGMs. We briefly describe a model that helps us study
how the introduction of microfinance impacts the structure of the network, which is the
subject of Banerjee et al. (2016).
To do this, let us first describe a simple model in which people search for or invest in
relationships. Consider a game where agents have k tasks, each of which require a clique
of m` nodes. For simplicity, assume that the value of being in a group does not depend
on others’ observables or your own. An agent searches with effort e for partners of each
type of subgraph, and for simplicity we can think of this picking the contribution to the
probability of the subgraph forming directly and again assume that this is additive for
simplicity. So if i, j, k put in some efforts, the probability of them forming a group is
ei + ej + ek in this example. Assume there is a convex cost of effort.
Then the expected utility is
Ui (e) =
k∑
`=1
∑
i1,...,im`−1
u`
 ∑
r∈{i1,...,im`−1}
er
− 12c∑`
∑
i1,...,im`−1
e2`,i,i.
and therefore
u`
(
n
m`−1
)
=
(
n
m`−1
)
e`,i =⇒ e∗`,i = u`.
By symmetry then
p` =
1
m`
· u`
c
.
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Therefore the fundamental parameter to be estimated is the ratio of the marginal benefit
to the marginal cost, which we can define as β` := p`.
This is of course a stylized model. Banerjee et al. (2016) consider a more elaborate
model when thinking about how to model network response to microfinance exposure.
There we model the payoff to a link or a triangle as uL,θi,θj and uT,θi,θj ,θk where θi is a
node’s type: whether the node is likely (θi = H) or not (θi = L) to join microfinance if
it were available in the village.
If microfinance generates crowd-out of direct insurance links by raising the value of
autarky relative to the value of maintaining a link, then uL,H,θj and uT,H,θj ,θk should
decline in microfinance villages for every θi = H type. Ceteris paribus, equilibrium
efforts in maintaining or searching for partners of even L-types may decline in this case,
leading to an externality wherein links between all types decline. This is precisely what
we observe.
4.5. Example 4 (cont.): Links across Social Boundaries. Our final example looks
at the propensities to link across caste. Individuals are associated with groups and
identities that can lead to strong social norms - prescriptions and proscriptions - about
interactions across groups. For instance, in much of India there are strong forces that in-
fluence if and when individuals form relationships across castes. Are people significantly
more likely to form cross-caste relationships when those links are unsupported (without
any friends in common) compared to when those links are supported with at least one
friend in common? To answer this we need models that account for link dependencies, as
cliques of three or more may dictate greater adherence to a group norm prohibiting cer-
tain inter-caste relationships, while the norm may be circumvented in isolated bilateral
relationships.
We link two households if members of either engaged in favor exchange with each
other: that is, they borrowed or lent goods such as kerosene, rice or oil in times of need.
We work with two caste categories: the first consists of people in scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes and the second consists of those people in any other caste (Munshi
and Rosenzweig, 2006). Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are those defined by the
Indian government as being disadvantaged. This is a fundamental distinction over which
the strongest cultural forces are likely to focus. Additional norms are at work with finer
caste (jati) distinctions, but those norms are more varied depending on the particular
castes in question while this provides a clear barrier.
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As a simple model to address this issue, consider a process in which individuals may
meet in pairs or triples and then decide whether to form a given link or triangle. The
link is formed if and only if both individuals prefer to form the link, and a triangle is
formed if and only if all three individuals prefer to form it. This minimally complicates
an independent-link model enough to require modeling link interdependencies.
In particular, there are probabilities, denoted piL(diff), piL(same), that a given link
has an opportunity to form (i.e., the pair meets and can choose to form the relationship)
that depend on the pair of individuals being of different castes or of the same caste,
respectively. Similarly, there are probabilities, denoted piT (diff), piT (same), that a given
triangle has an opportunity to form (that the three people involved meet and can choose
to form the relationship) that depend on the triple of individuals being of all the same
castes or two of the same and one of a different caste.
As noted above, individual i’s utility of having a relationship with j can by influenced
by whether they share caste and is given by
ui(ij) = α0,L + β0,LSameCasteij + δ0,LX ′ij − L,ij,
where SameCasteij is a dummy for whether both individuals are members of the same
caste, Xij is a vector of covariates depending on Xi and Xj. For expositional simplicity
here, we set δL = 0. The outside option is normalized to zero, so PL(same) is the
probability that an individual desires to form a link with an individual of the same caste
group, and PL(diff) is the probability that an individual desires to form a link with an
individual of a different caste group.
The crucial point is that i can have returns that depend on being in a multilateral
relationship with j and k – that is conceptually distinct from having these two bilateral
relationships – and this can be given by
ui(ijk) = α0,L + β0,TSameCasteijk + δ0,TX ′ijk − T,i,jk,
where SameCasteijk is a dummy for whether all three individuals are members of the
same caste, Xijk is a vector of covariates depending on Xi, Xj, and Xk. Again for
expositional simplicity, we set δ0,T = 0. Correspondingly, PT (same) is the probability
that an individual desires to form a triangle when all individuals are of the same caste
group, and PT (diff) is the probability that an individual desires to form a triangle when
it consists of people from both caste groups.17
17This is a simplified model for illustration, but one can clearly consider preferences conditional on any
string of covariates. This extends a model such as that of Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009, 2010) to
allow for additional link dependencies. We could also be interested in higher order relationships.
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The hypothesis that we explore is that PT (diff)/PT (same) < PL(diff)/PL(same) so
that people are more reluctant to involve themselves in cross-caste relationships when
those are “public” in the sense that other individuals observe those relationships; with
a null hypothesis that they are equal PT (diff)/PT (same) = PL(diff)/PL(same).
Note that the probability that a “same” link forms is
pL(same) = PL(same)2piL(same)
as it requires both agents to agree, and the probability that a “different” link forms is
pL(diff) = PL(diff)2piL(diff).
Analogously for triangles we have
pT (same) = PT (same)3piT (same) and pT (diff) = PT (diff)3piT (diff),
where the cubic captures the fact that it takes three agreements to form the triangle.
The difference in the exponents reflects that it is more difficult to get a triangle to form
than a link. Hence, to perform a proper test, we have to adjust for the exponents as
otherwise we would just uncover a natural bias due to the exponent that would end up
favoring cross-caste links.
One challenge in identifying a preference bias is that it could be confounded by the
meeting bias. Thus, we first model the meeting process more explicitly and show that
we still have identification as the meeting bias makes triangles relatively more likely to
be cross-caste than links. Thus, our test is conservative in the sense that if we find
cross-caste links relatively more likely, that is evidence for a (strong) preference bias.
Consider a meeting process where people spend a fraction f of their time mixing in the
community that is predominantly of their own types and a fraction 1− f of their time
mixing in the other caste’s community. Then at any given snapshot in time, a community
would have f of its own types present and 1− f of the other type present, as depicted
in Figure 9. (Variations on this sort of biased meeting process appear in Currarini,
Jackson, and Pin (2009, 2010); Bramoulle´, Currarini, Jackson, Pin, and Rogers (2012).)
Lemma 1. A sufficient condition for PT (diff)
PT (same) <
PL(diff)
PL(same) is that
pT (diff)
pT (same) <
(
pL(diff)
pL(same)
)3/2
.
The proof appears in Appendix A, but follows from straightforward calculations.
Given Lemma 1, we can test our hypothesis directly from a SUGM that compares rela-
tive link and triangle counts (we can also include isolated nodes, but those do not impact
this hypothesis). In particular, we only need examine whether pT (diff)
pT (same) <
(
pL(diff)
pL(same)
)3/2
.
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Community A Community B
(a) Individuals all on
own-community side of
river
Community A Community B
(b) Fraction f = 14
mixed across communi-
ties
Figure 9. Geographically driven meeting process where agents spend
3/4 of their time in their own community.
Table 3. Parameter estimates by network type
p̂L(same) p̂T (same) p̂L(diff) p̂T (diff)
Information 0.0167 0.0004 0.0064 0.00003
(0.0007) (0.00004) (0.0004) (0.00000)
Favors 0.0125 0.0004 0.0042 0.00002
(0.0005) (0.00005) (0.0003) (0.00001)
Notes: Standard errors computed by nonparametric bootstrap-
ping with replacement 75 networks.
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates, again where we assume that all 75 networks
are independent draws from the same distribution, and a formal test rejects the null
pT (diff)
pT (same) =
(
pL(diff)
pL(same)
)3/2
with p < 0.001 for each network type.18
Finally, figure 10 shows the results when we allow the parameter estimates to vary by
village. For the bulk of villages, cross-caste relationships relative to within-caste rela-
tionships are more frequent as isolated links compared to being embedded in triangles,
for both information and favor networks.
18This is from doing a nonparametric bootstrap with replacement over the 75 villages for 10000 repe-
titions.
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Figure 10. Plots of estimates of pT,diff
pT,same
against p
3/2
L,diff
p
3/2
L,same
by village, for
information and favors networks.
5. Asymptotics
We now discuss the asymptotic properties of estimators of SUGMs. We provide con-
ditions under which the estimators are consistent and describe their asymptotic distri-
butions.
As we noted in Section 3, because this is a simple, parametric model, one can conduct
valid finite sample inference via simulations. Nonetheless, it is useful to understand the
asymptotic properties of these models and their associated estimators on their own right,
and because it may be useful in future research that builds on models such as these.
There are two natural perspectives to take. The first holds the number of nodes, n,
fixed, and allows the number of different realizations of networks R to tend to infinity.
In this case estimation and inference is straightforward, as there are a growing number
of independent realizations of the model and standard techniques apply. Notice that
most of the results in the previous section were done under this frame.
The second perspective holds the number of networks observed R fixed, usually at
R = 1, and then lets the number of nodes grow: n → ∞. This is the more challenging
perspective as the observations of various parts of a network are not independent.
Since in a typical SUGM the links may all be correlated, we also prove a new central
limit theorem for correlated random variables that that do not satisfy the standard
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mixing conditions used in time series and spatial econometrics. This result and technique
should be of interest beyond network models.
5.1. Many networks case. We do not go into much detail on this first perspective
because it follows standard statistical arguments. One has a collection of R networks,
each drawn independently according to a SUGM with the same parameter β0. We hold
n fixed in this thought experiment. Then the estimator of the parameters is consistent
and asymptotically normally distributed. For notational simplicity we omit covariates.
Let us define a moment function for network gr, r ∈ {1, . . . , R}, as
h (gr; β) := S (gr)− Eβ [S (gr)] .
Also define
H
(
β0
)
:= E
[
∇βh
(
gr; β0
)]
and
Σ := E
[
h
(
gr; β0
)
h
(
gr; β0
)′]
.
Proposition 3. Consider a SUGM model and parameter estimated by GMM using
moments as specified in Proposition 1; with identity-matrix weighting and for which the
rows of H are linearly independent. Then
β̂
P−→ β0
and √
R
(
β̂ − β0
)
 N (0, V )
where V = (HH ′)−1HΣH ′ (HH ′)−1.
This result follows by verifying the usual conditions for consistency and asymptotic
normality with independent observations, such as those in (Newey and McFadden, 1994).
5.2. Single large network case.
In many cases of interest the researcher has data from one large network. Therefore
we consider the case of large n asymptotics where the researcher observes a single large
network (so R = 1). This case is considerably more challenging as it involves only
correlated observations.
Network data tend to be sparse and clustered: with few links relative to the potential
number of links and where one’s neighbors tend to be linked to each other with much
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higher than an independent probability (e.g., see the background in Newman (2003);
Jackson (2008)). The clustering is the challenging aspect of asymptotics, since no part of
the graph is independent from any other part. Thus, we have to provide new techniques
for our asymptotic results. We provide two angles, one taking advantage of sparseness
and the other providing a new central limit theorem for correlated random variables.
5.2.1. Sequences of random networks. To describe how parameter estimates behave as
a function of the number of nodes n, is useful to consider a sequence of distributions
governed by parameters indexed by n and study the asymptotic behavior of estimators
of parameters along the sequence. This approach is standard in the random graphs
literature (e.g., see the classic book of Bollobas (2001)). Research on social networks has
long observed that parameters need to adjust with the number of nodes. For example,
friendship networks among a small set of agents (say 50 or 100) and large set of agents
(thousands or much more) often have comparable average degrees.19 As a concrete
example, consider friendships among high school students in the U.S. based on the
Add Health data set (e.g., see (Currarini, Jackson, and Pin, 2009, 2010)). There are
some high schools with only 30 students and others with around 3000 students. The
average degree is ranges between 6 and 8 over the high schools, the link probability
shrinks dramatically with n: from roughly 6/30 to roughly 8/3000. Thus, irrespective
of the size of their school, students have numbers of friends of roughly the same order
of magnitude, and so the frequency of friendship formation must decrease with n.
To address this, models of network formation generally tune the density as a function
of n. For instance an example of a sparse sequence is one in which P (gij = 1) = δn−1 so
that E [di] = δ and an example of a dense sequence is one in which P (gij = 1) = δ so
that E [di] = δ ·(n− 1) . In standard random graph theory, for instance the case of Erdos-
Renyi random graphs, researchers prove asymptotic theorems that apply to a sequence
pn of link probabilities, as a function of a growing number of nodes n (again, see Bollobas
(2001)). Here, to prove asymptotic theorems we sequence the parameters βn. Allow-
ing parameters to change in n complicates identification and consistency/asymptotic
normality arguments, but is necessary in order to have a useful theory.
There are many things that could drive the rates of subgraph formation as a function
of n. Generally humans have time constraints that limit meeting rates and relationship
formation. For instance at a conference with thirty people, a person might have an
19See Chandrasekhar (2015) for examples networks of varying size ranging from village network data
in sub-saharan Africa or India to university dorm friendship network data which all exhibit somewhat
comparable number of links per node.
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opportunity to talk with most of the other attendees, but at a conference with ten
thousand people, the person might only have an opportunity to talk with a hundred or
so of the others.
Thus, we consider a sequence of SUGMs with subgraphs (G1, ..., Gk) that form on n
nodes that are generated with probabilities βn = (βn1 , ..., βnk ). The superscript on the
βn indicates the dependence on n to allow for meeting and subgraph formation rates to
vary along the sequence. It is convenient to express these in a form
βn` =
b`
nh`
for some b` > 0 and h` > 0, as this allows us to directly see how the parameter varies
with n. So this is a general way of agnostically encoding the rates that could come from
meeting, time budgets, or any other story that gives rise to sparse sequences. We are
still interested in estimation βn, and the h` parameters just help in stating the theorems
and are not necessarily of interest on their own but could be estimated if one also models
things like meeting rates and preferences.
5.2.2. Identification, Consistency and Asymptotic Normality. There are two issues that
need to be dealt with. One is to ensure that as n → ∞, different enough values of
the parameter βn and βn′ must lead to correspondingly different expectations of the
moment functions, in the sense of identifiable uniqueness. Otherwise, loosely speaking,
the differences in counts of subgraphs will be insufficient to accurately estimate the
parameters. The second is to see whether the parameter estimates have a limiting
normal distribution. Here, given that we have correlated observations, standard central
limit theorems do not apply. In fact, even existing central limit theorems that involve
mixing conditions (e.g., from the time series literature) do not apply here. Hence, we
prove a new central limit theorem for correlated random variables.
We use a strong metric for distances between parameters so that they will be accu-
rately estimated even if the network is sparse so that the parameters are small. We
set20
(5.1) δ(x, y) := max
`
[ |x` − y`|
max(|x`|, |y`|)
]
,
then the requirement becomes
max
`
∣∣∣β̂n` − βn0,`∣∣∣
max(
∣∣∣β̂n` ∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣βn0,`∣∣∣)
P−→ 0.
20We take 0/0 = 0.
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This requires that β̂n` and βn0,` be proportional to each other far enough along the se-
quence. Thus, if βn0 approaches 0, saying that β̂n` is a good estimate of it under this
metric also requires that β̂n` approach 0 at the same rate, which is a much stronger
conclusion than just requiring that the two parameters converge in the usual Euclidean
metric.21
Henceforth we take (5.1) to be the metric, unless otherwise specified.22
The second issue concerns the asymptotic distribution of the estimated parameter β̂n.
Deriving a limiting distribution for β̂n requires deriving a limiting distribution for Sn(g).
With a single graph, a central limit theorem for Sn(g) does not exist, because there are
potential correlations in all the links. For instance, any two links can be part of the
same clique of 4, and so in any model with cliques of 4 nodes, all links are correlated.
Even with just links and triangles all adjacent links are correlated since they could be
part of the same triangle, and any two adjacent triangles are correlated since they share
a common link.
For instance, in the case of links and triangles, we would like to show that
SnL(g)− Eβn0 [SL(g)]
σnL
 N (0, 1),
and
SnT (g)− Eβn0 [ST (g)]
σnT
 N (0, 1),
where (σnL)2 := var (SnL(g)) and (σnT )2 := var (SnT (g)). Since
SnL(g) =
∑
i<j gij(
n
2
) and SnT (g) =
∑
i<j<k gijgikgjk(
n
3
)
21To see why this is better than a weaker metric, consider the degenerate estimator of β̂n` = 0. In this
case δ(0, βn0,`) =
nh` ·|0−βn0,`|
b0,`
= |0−b0,`|b0,` = 1 which does not tend to zero - so the δ metric tells us that this
is not a good estimator, but if we just worked with standard distance as our metric, then
∣∣∣0− βn0,`∣∣∣→ 0.
22As we show below, our estimation will be consistent even in this strong metric. If the parameters are all
positive, then this ensures a strong form of convergence. And we note that if one of the true parameters
is 0 then this is very strong and requires that the actual parameter estimate is 0 with a probability
going to 1. To see why this will actually hold in many models, consider the case of the links and
triangles model. If the true link parameter is 0, then all links will be in triangles. Parameter estimates
of 0 for links and the fraction of triangles actually observed for triangles (adjusted for incidentals from
triangles) minimizes the objective function and gives a 0, so will be the actual estimates (as the model
is identified and has a unique minimizer as we have shown). Thus, the link parameter estimate will be
0 with probability 1, and so consistency will hold. If instead, the true triangle parameter was 0, then
the only triangles would be incidentals, and with a probability growing in the number of nodes (under
our assumptions below) the identification equations will again have a unique corner maximizer which
would have 0 for the triangle parameter.
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and gnij and gnik are correlated for any k, SnL involves correlated random variables, and
since any two triples in SnT that involve a common link are correlated, we need to carefully
check that we can still prove a central limit theorem and that the correlation will not
cause problems in the limit.
To accomplish this, we prove a new central limit theorem for a class of generally
correlated random variables, and then show how it can be applied here. This is done in
Appendix C. With that new central limit theorem in hand, we can prove the following
result for the model with links and triangles. This approach can be extended, of course,
to other SUGM models, but the actual proof will be case-by-case. It is useful to define
the variance-covariance matrix of the moments and a rate matrix
Vn =
 var(nhLSL) cov(nhLSL, nhTST )
cov(nhLSL, nhTST ) var(nhTST )
 and Rn =
 nhL 0
0 nhT
 .
With these defined we can state our result.
Proposition 4. Consider a links and triangles SUGM with associated parameters
βn0,L, β
n
0,T =
(
b0,L
nhL
,
b0,T
nhT
)
with 0 ≤ D < b0,L, b0,T < D such that
hL ∈ (1/2, 2) and hT ∈ [hL + 1,min[3, 3hL]),
excluding the case in which hT = hL + 1 and hL > 1.23 Consider the GMM estimator β̂
using moments S = (SL(g), ST (g)). Then
δ
(
β̂n, βn0
) P−→ 0
and24
V −1/2n Rn
(
β̂n − βn0
)
 N (0, I) ,
The proposition establishes that not only do the parameter estimates converge to
their true values, but that they are approximately normally distributed around the true
parameters for large networks.
The proposition requires some rates on the size of the parameters - if the parameters
are too tiny (converge to 0 much too rapidly), then the networks will be nearly empty
even in the limit and there will not be enough data to generate a central limit theorem.
Conversely, if the network is extremely dense then it will be nearly complete and there
will also not be enough variation to generate a central limit theorem. The proposition
23We conjecture that the theorem works for this measure zero case as well, though we have not been
able to show it using our current proof technique. Simulations suggest that the result should hold in
this region as well.
24The expression for Vn is different when hT = hL + 1, and is given in the proof of the proposition.
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states that if the parameters are not too extreme then the parameter estimates are
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed as the central limit theorem holds.
5.2.3. Direct Estimation with Sparse Networks.
While the results presented to this point provide general methods of estimating
SUGMs, they involve calculations that can be circumvented in many cases of interest. In
particular, many observed networks are sparse. For instance, even looking within limited
settings, typical researchers have at most dozens of co-authors even though there are
tens of thousands of researchers in any field. Generally, average degrees of nodes are of
small order compared to the number of nodes, and this means that very simple direct
counting methods can be accurate in estimating SUGMs in many applications - one can
directly estimate parameters from observed counts. We give precise definitions of spar-
sity that ensure that the direct count estimates are accurate estimators for parameters
in such sparse domains; and these restrictions apply in many settings of interest.
We call these estimators direct estimators, and denote them by β˜ to distinguish them
from the GMM estimators, β̂, though obviously these too correspond to a set of moments.
The core idea is that when subgraph formation is sufficiently sparse, it is rare for a smaller
subgraphs to incidentally generate larger ones. So, starting by counting the frequency
of larger subgraphs (e.g., triangles in this case), then we can directly and accurately
estimate the parameter that drives their formation. Next, after removing the triangles
(since they always incidentally generate links), we then can count the relative frequency
of links on the remaining pairs of nodes, which consistently estimates link formation.
Note that even though the parameters are estimated based on direct counts of sub-
graphs, there is still an important logic that needs to be imposed on how subgraphs are
counted - for example, only estimating the frequency of links once we have removed the
triangles. The ordering in which we do our counting is important since even in a sparse
network larger subgraphs can still incidentally generate smaller subgraphs, but smaller
ones will rarely incidentally generate larger ones.
The following proposition covers the case of links and triangles. Proposition D.1
provides the result for general SUGMs and appears in the appendix
It is useful to define the variance-covariance matrix of the moments and a rate matrix
Vn =
 var(nhLSU) cov(nhLSU , nhTST )
cov(nhLSU , nhTST ) var(nhTST )
 and Rn =
 nhL 0
0 nhT
 .
With these defined we can state our result.
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Proposition 5 (Consistency and Asymptotic Normality of Direct Estimators of Sparse
Link and Triangle SUGMs). Consider a links and triangles SUGM with associated pa-
rameters βn0,L, βn0,T =
(
b0,L
nhL
,
b0,T
nhT
)
with 0 ≤ D < b0,L, b0,T < D such that
hL ∈ (2/3, 2) and hT ∈ [2,min[3, 3hL]).
Consider the direct estimator β˜ using S = (SU(g), ST (g)). Then
δ
(
β˜n, βn0
) P−→ 0
and
V −1/2n Rn
(
β˜n − βn0
)
 N (0, I) ,
Proposition 5 states that growing and relatively sparse SUGMs are consistently es-
timable via a very simple estimation technique that is easily computable. We illustrate
the consistency of the direct estimator in Appendix C.2.4, and show how it is consistent
for low parameter values, but then as parameter values grow one must use GMM to get
fully consistent estimates. The illustration is for 500 nodes – and as n grows there is a
larger range of degrees that are admitted, as we know from our results that degree that
can grow at any rate that is less than n1/3 and still satisfy the sparsity conditions for
consistency.
The proof of the proposition involves showing that under the counting convention
the fraction of incidentally generated remaining subnetworks vanishes for each `, and
the observed counts of subnetworks converge to the truly generated ones. And then,
by a standard limiting argument applied to the truly generated subgraphs (which are
independent), the appropriately normalized vector of subgraph counts are asymptotically
normally distributed (with an approximately independent distribution).
6. Conclusion
We have provided a new class of network models – SUGMs – that are designed for
the practical statistical estimation of social and economic networks, especially as the
edges in such networks tend to be correlated. These models substantially outperform
standard stochastic block models in generating networks that match observed network
characteristics. We have shown that a broad class of these models are well-identified and
can be easily estimated by GMM, or even more basic and direct techniques in the case
of sparse networks. In order to establish asymptotic properties of our estimators, we
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have proven a new central limit theorem for correlated random variables (that appears
in the appendix). We illustrated the power of these models via several applications.
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Appendix A. Omitted Proofs and Auxiliary Results
Proof of Proposition 1. Order subgraph types so that the number of links a subgraph
of type ` is nondecreasing in `.
Let `∗ be the smallest ` for which β` 6= β′`.
Note that Eβ
[
S`∗ (g)sub−only
]
depends only on β` for ` ≤ `∗ since this expectation
considers only instances of the subgraph that do not intersect with larger ` and also
compare them to possible instances in which if the graph were present it would not have
been incidentally generated by any larger subgraph. Note also that Eβ
[
S`∗ (g)sub−only
]
is nondecreasing in β` for ` < `∗ and strictly increasing in β`∗ . This follows the presence
of any such subgraph can be written as the max of an indicator that the subgraph
was generated directly, and an indicator that it was generated incidentally by some
combination of smaller-indexed subgraphs and adjacent subgraphs of its own type. The
likelihood of the first indicator is exactly β`∗ and so strictly increases in β`∗ , and the
second likelihood is nondecreasing in β` for ` ≤ `∗, and so overall the probability is
nondecreasing in β` for ` < `∗ and strictly increasing in β`∗ .
Thus, since β` = β′` for all ` < `∗ and β`∗ 6= β′`∗ , it follows directly that Eβ
[
S`∗ (g)sub−only
]
6=
Eβ′
[
S`∗ (g)sub−only
]
.
Proof of Proposition 2.
First, note that 1− (1− βnT )x is the probability that some link is formed as part of at
least one triangle out of x possible triangles that could have it as an edge (independently
of whether it also forms directly).
Next, note that the probability that a link forms conditional on some particular tri-
angle that it could be a part of not forming is25
(A.1) q˜L = βL + (1− βL)
(
1− (1− βT )n−3
)
.
Given this, note that the probability that a link forms can be written as
(A.2) qL = βT + (1− βT )q˜L,
noting that a link could form as part of a triangle that it is part of, or else form conditional
upon that triangle not forming.
We can write the probability of some triangle forming as
(A.3) qT = βT + (1− βT )(q˜L)3,
25That is, consider a given pair of nodes i, j and a third node k. Consider the probability that link ij
is formed conditional on triangle ijk not forming directly as a triangle.
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where the first expression βT is the probability that the triangle is directly generated,
and then the second expression (1 − βT )(q˜L)3 is the probability that it was not gen-
erated directly, but instead all three of the edges formed on their own (which happen
independently, conditional on the triangle not forming, which has probability (q˜L)3).
The result follows from Lemma A.1, with x1 = βL, x2 = βT , qL = a1 (x), qT = a2 (x)
and q˜L = f (x).
Lemma A.1. Let x = (x1, x2) ∈ (0, 1)2 and a (x) = (a1 (x) , a2 (x)) be two real-valued
functions
a1 (x) = x2 + (1− x2) f (x)
a2 (x) = x2 + (1− x2) f (x)3 ,
with
f (x) = x1 + (1− x1)
[
1− (1− x2)N
]
= (1− x2)N + 1− (1− x1) (1− x2)N
for some integer N ≥ 0.
Then
x 6= x′ =⇒ a (x) 6= a (x′) .
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Then
x′2 + (1− x′2) f (x′) = x2 + (1− x2) f (x)
x′2 + (1− x′2) f (x′)3 = x2 + (1− x2) f (x)3 ,
First, note that if x′2 = x2, then since these are both less than one, the first equation
above implies that f(x′) = f(x). However, that is not possible since f is increasing in
x1 and x′1 6= x1 - recalling that x′ 6= x and x′2 = x2 . Thus, x′2 6= x2, and so without loss
of generality consider the case in which x′2 < x2. This implies that both
f (x′) = bf (x) + c
and
f (x′)3 = bf (x)3 + c,
where b = 1−x21−x′2 ∈ (0, 1) and c =
x2−x′2
1−x′2 ∈ (0, 1), and b+ c = 1.
This implies that
bf (x)3 + 1− b = (bf (x) + 1− b)3.
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This as an equation of the form
by3 + 1− b = (by + 1− b)3
where b ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1). Note that the left hand side is larger when y = 0 and
the two are equal when y = 1, and that the derivative of the difference is
3by2 − 3b(by + 1− b)2 = 3b
[
y2 − (by + 1− b)2
]
< 0
so the difference is decreasing over the entire interval, and hits 0 at the end of the
interval. Therefore the difference is always positive in (0, 1) and so there is no solution.
Thus, our supposition was incorrect, establishing the lemma.
Lemma A.2. Any event (in the Borel σ-algebra) associated with any SUGM has a prob-
ability that is an analytic function (and so it is in C∞), and has derivatives and cross
partials at all levels being uniformly continuous and bounded on the whole parameter
space of [0, 1]k.
Proof. An ‘outcome’ (the basic states underlying the Borel σ-algebra) is a specification
of exactly which subgraphs form and which do not - so a complete specification of what
happens. Any event then corresponds to a set of outcomes, and so its probability is a
sum of probabilities of the outcomes.
Each outcome’s probability is of the form∏
`
βz`` (1− β`)m`−z`
where z` indicates how many subgraphs of type ` are present in the outcome. Since each
of these functions is analytic (and hence in C∞), all of the derivatives and partials, cross
partials, etc., are continuous and bounded on [0, 1]k and hence uniformly continuous on
[0, 1]k. Any event is then a finite sum of analytic functions and so the result follows
directly.
Proof of Proposition 3.
First we check consistency by the conditions of Theorem 2.6 of Newey and McFadden
(1994). For (i): let Ŵ be the identity matrix and then observe that Proposition 1
implies that Eβ0 [S (gr)] − Eβ [S (gr)] = 0 only if β = β0. For (ii), we have assumed
that the parameter space is compact (and in fact in the interior of this space). (iii)
follows from the fact that Eβ [S (gr)] is continuous at each β with probability one since
it composes continuous functions of parameter entries. Finally (iv) follows from the fact
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that since every S` and Ssub−only` are shares, they are strictly less than 1 and therefore
E
[
supβ ‖h (gr; β)‖
]
< K <∞.
Next we check asymptotic normality by the conditions of Theorem 3.4 of Newey and
McFadden (1994). We meet the conditions of Theorem 2.6 already and have β0 in
the interior of the compact parameter space, so (i) is met. We see (iii) holds since by
definition 0 = Eβ0 [h (gr; β0)] = Eβ0 [S (gr)] − Eβ0 [S (gr)] and Eβ0
[
‖h(gr; β0)‖2
]
< K2 <
∞. Both (ii) and (iv) follow from Lemma A.2. Finally, for (v), HH ′ follows from the
assumption of linear independence of rows of H.
Proof of Lemma 1. Having two randomly picked nodes bump into each other within
a community, there is a f 2 + (1 − f)2 probability of the nodes being of the same type,
and a 1−(f 2 +(1−f)2) probability of them being of different types.26 Thus, the relative
meeting frequency of different type links compared same type links is
piL(diff)
piL(same)
= 1− (f
2 + (1− f)2)
f 2 + (1− f)2 .
For triangles, picking three individuals out of the community at any point in time would
lead to a f 3+(1−f)3 probability that all three are of the same type, and 1−(f 2+(1−f)2)
of them being of mixed types, and so
piT (diff)
piT (same)
= 1− (f
3 + (1− f)3)
f 3 + (1− f)3 .
It follows directly that for f ∈ (0, 1):
(A.4) piT (same)
piT (diff)
<
piL(same)
piL(diff)
.
So different type triangles are more likely to have opportunities to form under this
random mixing model than different type links. In particular, note that
PT (diff)
PT (same)
<
PL(diff)
PL(same)
if and only if
(
pT (diff)
pT (same)
piT (same)
piT (diff)
)1/3
<
(
pL(diff)
pL(same)
piL(same)
piL(diff)
)1/2
.
In summary, given (A.4), a sufficient condition for PT (diff)
PT (same) <
PL(diff)
PL(same) is that
(pT (diff)/pT (same)) < (pL(diff)/pL(same))3/2
which completes the argument.
26 To keep things simple, we consider equal-sized groups, but the argument extends with some adjust-
ments to asymmetric sizes.
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Appendix B. Identification in an Example with Links and Z-stars
Note that Z-stars are somewhat thorny as adding one link from the center of a Z-star
to another node now results in Z incidental Z-stars. Nonetheless, we can still identify
them from counts of simple statistics.
It is useful to work with a parameter
β
n
0,Z = 1− (1− βn0,Z)2(
n−2
Z−1)
which is the probability that a link ij forms incidentally via on of 2
(
n−2
Z−1
)
possible Z-stars
of which ij could potentially be a part.
Again, we say that a sequence of SUGMs is well-balanced if the probability that a link
is formed directly or formed as part of some Z-star are of the same order: βn0,Z = Θ(βn0,L).
Proposition B.1.
• A SUGM based on links and Z-stars is identified by SL, SdSd−1 , where Sd is the
fraction of nodes that have degree d, for any choice of 0 < d < Z. That is, if
β′L, β
′
Z 6= βL, βK then(
Eβ′L,β′Z [SL(g)] ,
Eβ′L,β′Z [Sd(g)]
Eβ′L,β′Z [Sd−1(g)]
)
6=
(
EβL,βZ [SL(g)] ,
EβL,βZ [Sd(g)]
EβL,βZ [Sd−1(g)]
)
.
• Moreover, if a sequence of SUGMs is well-balanced and βn0,L and βn0,Z are bounded
away from 1, then βn0,L, β
n
0,Z are identifiably unique.27
In Proposition B.1 the identification is based on a comparison between the relative
frequency of two degrees: d and d − 1, for any 0 < d < Z. For many choices of β,
identification can be achieved with just EβL,βZ [Sd(g)] rather than
EβL,βZ [Sd(g)]
EβL,βZ [Sd−1(g)]
, but to
get identification across all parameter values requires comparison of two degrees.
Proof of Proposition B.1.
First, note that
(B.1) qL := EβL,βZ [SL(g)] = βL + (1− βL)
(
1− (1− βZ)2(
n−2
Z−1)
)
,
27Here the rnL, rnZ are both set to be the order of βn0,L, and the identifiable uniqueness is achieved via(
EβL,βZ [SL(g)]
rn ,
EβL,βZ [Sd(g)]
rnEβL,βZ [Sd−1(g)]
)
.
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where the (1 − βZ)2(
n−2
Z−1) represents the probability that none of the 2
(
n−2
Z−1
)
possible
Z-stars, of which ij could potentially be a part, form.
The expected fraction of nodes having degree d < Z is
(B.2) qd := EβL,βZ [Sd(g)] =
(
n− 1
d
)
pid(1− pi)n−1−d(1− βZ)(
n−1
Z ),
where
pi = βL + (1− βL)
(
1− (1− βZ)(
n−2
Z−1)
)
is the probability that some link ij forms without it being part of a Z-star centered at
i.
We show the first part of proposition by showing that if
(B.3)
(qL, qd/qd−1) =
(
Eβ′L,β′Z [SL(g)] ,
Eβ′L,β′Z [Sd(g)]
Eβ′L,β′Z [Sd−1(g)]
)
=
(
EβL,βZ [SL(g)] ,
EβL,βZ [Sd(g)]
EβL,βZ [Sd−1(g)]
)
then βL, βZ = β′L, β′Z .
If βL, βZ = (0, 0) then qL = 0 which implies directly from (B.1) that β′L, β′Z = (0, 0),
and so that case is straightforward. So, we concentrate on the case in which βL, βZ 6=
(0, 0), which then implies that qL > 0. Similarly, we consider the case in which βL <
1, βZ < 1 (as otherwise the network is complete), which implies that qL < 1 and then
that β′L < 1, β′Z < 1, which then also implies that 0 < qd < 1.
By (B.1):
qL = βL + (1− βL)
(
1− (1− βZ)2(
n−2
Z−1)
)
.
which implies that
(1− βZ)2(
n−2
Z−1) =
(
1− qL
1− βL
)1/2
.
This implies that
qd =
(
n− 1
d
)
pi(βL)d(1− pi(βL))n−1−d
(
1− qL
1− βL
)(n−1)/(2Z)
,
where
pi(βL) = 1− (1− βL)1/2 (1− qL)1/2 .
This implies that
(B.4) qd/qd−1 = pi(βL)/(1− pi(βL)).
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Thus, repeating the argument for β′ and then employing (B.3):
1− (1− βL)1/2 (1− qL)1/2
(1− βL)1/2 (1− qL)1/2
= 1− (1− β
′
L)1/2 (1− qL)1/2
(1− β′L)1/2 (1− qL)1/2
.
Thus
1
(1− βL)1/2 =
1
(1− β′L)1/2
,
which implies that βL = β′L. This then implies that βZ = β′Z via (B.1), and so we have
established the result.
To establish identifiable uniqueness we argue that for any ε > 0 there exists φ > 0
such that for large enough n, if δ((βnL, β
n
Z), (βn0,L, β
n
0,Z)) > ε, then at least one of the
following inequalities holds: ∣∣∣∣∣Eβn [SL(g)]− Eβn0 [SL(g)]rn
∣∣∣∣∣ > φ
or ∣∣∣∣∣ Eβn [Sd(g)]rnEβn [Sd−1(g)] −
Eβn0 [Sd(g)]
rnEβn0 [Sd−1(g)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > φ.
So, suppose the contrary: there exists a subsequence of (βnL, β
n
K), (βn0,L, β
n
0,Z) and φn →
0 such that for every n δ((βnL, β
n
Z), (βn0,L, β
n
0,Z)) > ε and yet∣∣∣∣∣Eβn [SL(g)]− Eβn0 [SL(g)]rn
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ φn
and ∣∣∣∣∣ Eβn [Sd(g)]rnEβn [Sd−1(g)] −
Eβn0 [Sd(g)]
rnEβn0 [Sd−1(g)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ φn.
By (B.4), it follows that28
qnd/q
n
d−1 = 1− (1− βnL)1/2 (1− qnL)1/2
and
qn0,d/q
n
0,d−1 = 1− (1− βn0,L)1/2
(
1− qn0,L
)1/2
.
Suppose that |qnL − qn0,L| ≤ rnφn. For any γ > 0, if
|βnL − βn0,L|
max(βnL, βn0,L)
> γ
then
|βnL − βn0,L| > c1rnγ,
28We use the obvious notation for qnd and qn0,d, and so forth following (B.1) and (B.2), to indicate the
expected counts associated with the parameters βn and βn0 .
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and so it follows that for small enough φn, |qnd/qnd−1 − qn0,d/qn0,d−1| > φn, which is a
contradiction. Thus, it must also be that there is a sequence γn → 0, and a further
subsequence of our parameters such that
|βnL − βn0,L| ≤ γn
along the subsequence.
Along the subsequence it must then be that
|βnZ − βn0,Z |
max(βnZ , β
n
0,Z)
> ε,
and so
|βnZ − βn0,Z | > c1rnε.
But now, from (B.1)
qnL = βnL + (1− βnL)βnZ
and
qn0,L = βn0,L + (1− βn0,L)βn0,Z .
Then given that βn0,L, β
n
0,Z are bounded away from 1, and that |βnL − βn0,L| ≤ γn → 0,
while |βnZ − βn0,Z | > c1rnε implies the the difference in the two equations above cannot
tend to 0, which is a contradiction. Thus, our supposition was incorrect.
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Appendix C. Consistency and Asymptotic Normality in Single Large
Network Case
C.1. A Central Limit Theorem for Correlated Random Variables. We start
with a new central limit theorem that applies for our case. Existing central limit the-
orems that allow for correlated random variables do not apply for our setting as they
require require a spatial/ordered lattice structure (e.g., Bolthausen (1982). In the typi-
cal logic of central limit theorems based on strong mixing arguments in the spatial and
time series literature, random variables are embedded in some space where there are
“close” and “far” random variables and the further they are, the less correlated they are.
Other researchers (e.g., Boucher and Mourifie´ (2012); Leung (2014)) working on network
formation exploit these spatial techniques by embedding nodes in some space so that
only “nearby” nodes can link and “distant” nodes cannot link in order to satisfy mixing
conditions and apply a central limit theorem like Bolthausen (1982). As n → ∞ most
nodes get further and further apart and therefore essentially never link. The reason this
is unsatisfying for our purposes is that such a strategy imposes a specific structure on
the adjacency matrix: it has to be nearly block-diagonal. To see this, consider the simple
case where nodes live on a line. Then in the adjacency matrix, only nodes within some
limited distance to the left or right of any given node tend to be linked. While this may
be fine for certain contexts, it is not an adequate description of a village network where
there is no natural space on which some households in a village should be considered,
ex ante, to be infinitely far apart (or students in a dorm should be considered, ex ante,
to be infinitely unlikely to link to each other).
This is why the existing central limit theorems do not apply for our setting. Our
modeling approach employs no such “nearby” versus ”distant” approach, and is novel to
the literature. In order to manage this we prove a central limit theorem for correlated
random variables which cannot be embedded in a spatial setting. The closest work is
the literature on dependency graphs, discussed below.
We require some new notation, which we later apply to SUGMs.
Let {XNα : α ∈ ΛN} be an array of random variables taking on values in [0, 1]. Here
α ∈ ΛN is the set of labels, and the index is such that |ΛN | = N . For instance, in
our SUGM settings the Xα may be an indicator of the appearance of some particular
subgraph, such as a link or triangle, the α would track the pairs of nodes involved in a
potential link (ij) or triples of nodes in a triangle (ijk), and N captures the
(
n
2
)
possible
links or
(
n
3
)
possible triangles.
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Let
SN :=
∑
α∈ΛN
(
XNα − E
[
XNα
])
.
We provide conditions under which a normalized statistic
S
N := S
N
a
1/2
N
 N (0, 1),
where the normalizer, aN , is a measure of the variance of SN .
C.1.1. Stein’s Lemma.
Our proof uses a lemma from Stein (1986). We review it here, both to be self-
contained and also to explain why this approach to proving asymptotic normality is
useful and distinct from other approaches in the networks literature.
The key observation of Stein (1986) is that if a random variable satisfies
E[f ′(Y )− Y f(Y )] = 0
for every f(·) that is continuous and continuously differentiable, then it must have a
standard normal distribution.
This observation leads to a useful lemma, that allows one to characterize the Kol-
mogorov distance between a random variable Y and a standard normally distributed Z,
denoted dK(Y, Z). We can bound this from above by (a constant times) the Wasserstein
distance, dW (Y, Z), which is the supremum of the above expression taken over a class of
bounded functions with bounded first and second derivatives.
Lemma C.1 (Stein (1986); Ross (2011)). If Y is a random variable and Z has the
standard normal distribution, then
dW (Y, Z) ≤ sup
{f :||f ||,||f ′′||≤2,||f ′||≤
√
2/pi}
|E[f ′(Y )− Y f(Y )]| .
Further
dK(Y, Z) ≤ (2/pi)1/4(dW (Y, Z))1/2.
By this lemma, if we show that a normalized sum of random variables satisfies
dW (S
N
, Z) = sup
{f :||f ||,||f ′′||≤2,||f ′||≤
√
2/pi}
∣∣∣E[f ′(SN)− SNf(SN)]∣∣∣→ 0,
then it must be asymptotically normally distributed.
Arguments based on Stein (1986), and his precursor work, Stein (1972), have been
used to derive central limit theorems in two literatures: spatial statistics and dependency
A NETWORK FORMATION MODEL BASED ON SUBGRAPHS 7
graphs. For example, for sequences of α-mixing random variables in the spatial statistics
literature, the oft-used Bolthausen (1982) central limit theorem uses a lemma from Stein
(1972) to show asymptotic normality. In the spatial statistics literature, a standard
structure would have ΛN ⊂ Zd and this set is thought of as growing outwards with N .
Then as ΛN expands, the α’s that are added along the sequence are increasingly far
apart, and correlations vanish with distance so that Xα is only correlated with Xη that
are close to α in the lattice. This does not work for our purposes because our setting
has no such spatial structure, and we wish to allow any nodes to link to each other in
our networks.
The dependency graph approach is closer to our approach and eliminates such spatial
structure. Instead, collections of random variables are represented on a graph, where
a link between two indices mean that they are correlated and no link means they are
independent. The normalized sum is then asymptotically normally distributed provided
that the dependency graph is sufficiently sparse (Baldi and Rinott (1989); Goldstein and
Rinott (1996); Chen and Shao (2004)). However, previous results in that literature place
overly-restrictive conditions on how various Xαs can be correlated across α. For instance,
we want models where in principle all links can be ex ante correlated, and in overlapping
ways. Even previous results allowing for high- and low-correlation dependency sets are
far too stringent to apply to our setting (Ross, 2011; Goldstein and Rinott, 1996; Chen
and Shao, 2004).
Our approach can be thought of as extending the dependency neighborhoods ap-
proach. In principle every Xα and Xη can be correlated, but we separate those into
more highly and less highly correlated sets, and we still obtain a central limit theorem
under fairly weak conditions that bound the total and relative correlations in these sets.
For instance, in our context, the highly correlated sets for our example with triangles
would be triangles that share a node or an edge, and the less correlated sets would be
triangles that have no nodes in common.
C.1.2. Dependency neighborhoods.
For each α,N , we partition the index set of other random variables, ΛN , into two
pieces. In particular, we define a set, called a dependency neighborhood, for each α,N :
∆ (α,N) ⊂ ΛN such that α ∈ ∆ (α,N) .
The conditions for η ∈ ∆(α,N) are precisely defined below. We need ΛN to be par-
titioned into ∆(α,N) sets for each α in a specific manner to satisfy a few sufficient
conditions.
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Intuitively, this set includes the Xη’s that have relatively “high” correlation with Xα,
and generally its complement includes the Xη’s that have relatively “low” correlation
with Xα. There is substantial freedom in defining these sets, but an easy rule to ap-
plying them to (non-sparse) SUGMs is to set the ∆ (α,N) sets to include the other
subgraphs with which the subgraph α shares some edges and could have potentially
been incidentally generated.29
We show that under conditions on the relative correlations inside and outside of the
dependency neighborhoods, a central limit theorem applies.
C.1.3. The Central Limit Theorem.
We consider sequences such that the distribution over the Xαs is symmetric (although
not necessarily exchangeable).30
Let
aN :=
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N)
cov (Xα, Xη) ,
be the total sum of covariances across all the pairs of variables in each other’s dependency
neighborhoods, and let
S
N := S
N
a
1/2
N
be the normalized statistic.
In what follows, we maintain that aN →∞, as otherwise there is insufficient variation
to obtain a central limit theorem.
The following are the key conditions for the theorem:
(C.1)
∑
α;η,γ∈∆(α,N)
E [XαXηXγ] = o
(
a
3/2
N
)
,
(C.2)
∑
α,α′,η∈∆(α,N),η′∈∆(α′,N)
cov ((Xα − µ)(Xη − µ), (Xα′ − µ)(Xη′ − µ)) = o
((
aN
)2)
,
(C.3)
∑
α;η/∈∆(α,N)
cov (Xα, Xη) = o (aN) , and
29In the sparse case, one can set ∆ (α,N) = α, as in Corollary C.1.
30 Symmetry is the requirement that for any α and α′, there exists a permutation of labels that maps
α to α′ and leaves the distribution unchanged. For instance, the marginal distribution of any link ij is
similar to the distribution of any other link kl, and we can find a permutation of labels for which the
joint distributions over this link and all other links are the same. This does not, however, mean that
exchangeability holds, as the joint distribution of ij and jk, is not the same as the distribution over ij
and rs. Note also that this does not preclude allowing for node characteristics, as those will be encoded
into the specification of αs.
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(C.4) E[(Xα − µ)(Xη − µ)|Xη] ≥ 0 for every α, η /∈ ∆(α,N).
Even though E[(Xα − µ)(Xη − µ)|Xη] ≥ 0 in most applications (as subgraphs either
incidentally generate each other or don’t overlap at all, but do not tend to interact
negatively), we can do without the condition - it is used to provide a simpler statement
of (C.3).31
Condition (C.3) is an intuitive one that states that covariances between subgraphs
outside of each other’s dependency sets have a lower order of covariance than within
the dependency sets. Essentially, this just captures that dependency sets are properly
defined and therefore the variance of the sum is captured by the sum of variances and
covariances within dependency sets.
Conditions (C.1) and (C.2) are conditions that limit the extent to which there are
dependencies between more than two subgraphs at a time, requiring that these be of
lower order than interactions between two at a time. As we show below, these are
satisfied by basic examples of SUGMs. Some such conditions are clearly needed since
excessive dependence leads to a failure of a central limit theorem, and these extend the
literature sufficiently to cover our SUGMs, which were not covered before, except for
degenerate cases.
Theorem C.1. If (C.1)-(C.4) are satisfied, then SN N (0, 1).
It is useful to consider the special case in which ∆(α,N) = {α}, which still extends
and nests many standard central limit theorems. This corollary is particularly useful
when we get to the case of sparse networks, where incidental networks are unlikely and
the correlation between different subgraphs becomes small.
Corollary C.1. If E[(Xα − µ)(Xη − µ)|Xη] ≥ 0 for every η 6= α, and32
(i) var(Xα) ≥ µ2N−1/3+ε for some ε > 0 and large enough N ,
(ii) ∑α 6=η cov((Xα − µ)2, (Xη − µ)2) = o (N2var (Xα)2), and
(iii) ∑α 6=η cov(Xα, Xη) = o (Nvar (Xα)),
then SN N (0, 1).
Moreover, if the Xαs are Bernoulli random variables and have E[Xα] → 0, then (ii)
is implied by (iii).
31Below, we prove a stronger version of the theorem with a combined version of (C.3) and (C.4)
that only requires that
∑
α;η/∈∆(α,N) E [(Xα − µ)(Xη − µ) · sign (E[(Xα − µ)|Xη](Xη − µ))] = o(aN );
without requiring the nonnegative conditional covariance, E[(Xα−µ)(Xη −µ)|Xη] ≥ 0 for every α, η /∈
∆(α,N). See (C.6).
32Condition (i) can be weakened to N−1/3µ2 = o (var (Xα)), as shown in the appendix.
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Note that (ii) is often satisfied whenever (iii) is, and so this is an easy corollary that is
based on two intuitive conditions: the variance of the variable in question cannot vanish
too quickly (as there needs to be enough variation/information about the variables to get
convergence), and the covariance between variables cannot be too large. An application
of this corollary is given below, and the proof of the ‘Moreover’ statement appears there.
We outline the steps of the proof of Theorem C.1, which follow techniques pioneered
by Stein (1972, 1986) (see also Bolthausen (1982); Baldi and Rinott (1989); Ross (2011))
adapted to our setting, and a detailed proof appears in the appendix.
Recall that the crux of the proof requires showing that
(C.5)
∣∣∣E [Sf (S)]− E [f ′ (S)]∣∣∣
tends to zero.
In working with (C.5) it is useful to break it into pieces, and so it is useful to define
the (normalized) sum over the terms not in the dependency neighborhood:
Sα :=
∑
η/∈∆(α,N)
(Xη − µ)/a1/2N .
In order to see how we show (C.5), let us start with the E
[
Sf
(
S
)]
term:
E
[
Sf
(
S
)]
= E
[
1
a
1/2
N
∑
α
(Xα − µ) · f
(
S
)]
(by definition)
= E
 1a1/2N
∑
α
(Xα − µ)
(
f
(
S
)
− f
(
Sα
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
for a Taylor expansion
+ E
[
1
a
1/2
N
∑
α
(Xα − µ) · f
(
Sα
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
o(1) by (C.3)
.
The second line contains two pieces. The second piece is handled by (C.3) and several
lemmas that appear in Appendix A. So, then we have to bound the first part, which
we do via a Taylor expansion. We add and subtract a term containing f(Sα), which
is useful for a Taylor expansion (below). This generates an extra term, which in the
usual dependency graph literature is assumed to be zero, which cannot be used for our
purposes. We allow for modest but nontrivial amounts of correlation in these terms and
still establish the result.
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Now using the first expression from the above, we can rewrite our crucial expression
as
∣∣∣E [Sf (S)]− E [f ′ (S)]∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
E
 1a1/2N
∑
α
(Xα − µ)
(
f
(
S
)
− f
(
Sα
)
−
(
S − Sα
)
f ′
(
S
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
bounded by 2nd order remainder

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣E
[
1
a
1/2
N
∑
α
(Xα − µ)
(
S − Sα
)
f ′
(
S
)
− f ′(S)
]∣∣∣∣∣+ o(1).
Both (C.1) and (C.2) are then used to show that these terms go to zero as N → ∞.
Specifically, the first term, which is bounded by a second order remainder term, involves
expectations over products of triples and therefore is controlled by (C.1). The second
term can be factored to show that it involves the terms of the form in (C.2). These
sorts of terms arise in the dependency graph literature as well as the spatial statistics
literature as well, but our bounds on them are looser and more permissive, which turns
out to be critical for our applications.
C.1.4. Proofs of Theorem C.1 and Corollary C.1. The following lemmas are useful in
the proof of Theorem C.1.
Lemma C.2. A solution to maxh E[Zh(Y )] s.t. |h| ≤ 1 (where h is measurable) is
h(Y ) = sign(E[Z|Y ]), where we break ties, setting sign(E[Z|Y ]) = 1 when E[Z|Y ] = 0.
Proof. This can be seen from direct calculation:
E[Zh(Y )] =
ˆ
Y
E[Z|Y ]h(Y )dP(Y )
Maximizing E[Z|Y ]h(Y ) pointwise when |h| ≤ 1 is achieved by setting h(Y ) = sign(E[Z|Y ]),
and it is clearly ok to break ties by setting sign(E[Z|Y ]) = 1 when E[Z|Y ] = 0, as that
makes no difference in the integral.
Lemma C.3. E[XY h(Y )] when h(·) is measurable and bounded by
√
2
pi
satisfies
E[XY h(Y )] ≤
√
2
pi
E [XY · sign(E[X|Y ]Y )] .
Proof. This follows from Lemma C.2, setting Z = XY .
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Proof of Theorem C.1. By Lemma C.1, it is sufficient to show that the appropriate
sequence of random variables SN satisfies
sup
{f :||f ||,||f ′′||≤2,||f ′||≤
√
2/pi}
∣∣∣E[f ′(SN)− SNf(SN)]∣∣∣→ 0.
Recall
aN =
∑
α,η∈∆(α,N)
cov (Xα, Xη) ,
and
S
N = SN/a1/2N .
Also let the size of the dependency set be given by M(N) = |∆ (α,N) |.
Then define the following average covariances:
cN1 =
∑
η∈∆(α,N) cov (Xα, Xη)
M(N) , c
N
2 =
∑
η/∈∆(α,N) cov (Xα, Xη)
N −M(N) .
Note that aN = NM(N)cN1 .
For ease of notation, we omit the superscript Ns below.
Let
Sα :=
∑
η/∈∆(α,N)
(Xη − µ) and Sα := Sα/a1/2.
Observe that
E
[
Sf
(
S
)]
= E
[
1
a1/2
∑
α
(Xα − µ) · f
(
S
)]
= E
[
1
a1/2
∑
α
(Xα − µ)
(
f
(
S
)
− f
(
Sα
))]
+ E
[
1
a1/2
∑
α
(Xα − µ) · f
(
Sα
)]
.
The first step is to show that∣∣∣∣∣E
[
1
a1/2
∑
α
(Xα − µ) · f
(
Sα
)]∣∣∣∣∣ = o(1),
by (C.3).
To see this, observe that if E[Xα − µ|Xη − µ] is nonnegative for all α, η, then it
follows that sign (E[(Xα − µ)|(Xη − µ)](Xη − µ)) is always either 0 or 1. Therefore we
can reduce (C.3) to ∑α;η/∈∆ E[(Xα − µ)(Xη − µ)] = o(aN).
In order to apply this, we can expand the term to∣∣∣∣∣∣E
 1
a
1/2
N
∑
α∈Λ
(Xα − µ) · f
(
Sα
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣E
 1
a
1/2
N
∑
α∈Λ
(Xα − µ) · f
 1
a
1/2
N
∑
η/∈∆(α,N)
(Xη − µ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
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≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣E
 1
a
1/2
N
∑
α∈Λ
(Xα − µ) · f (µ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 since E[Xα−µ]=0.
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣E
 1
a
1/2
N
∑
α∈Λ
(Xα − µ) ·
 1
a
1/2
N
∑
η/∈∆(α,N)
(Xη − µ)
 · f ′ (Ŝα)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
where Ŝα is an intermediate value between Sα and µ.
To bound the second term, we apply Lemma C.3 to conclude that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
E
[∑
α∈Λ;η/∈∆(α,N) (Xα − µ) (Xη − µ) f ′
(
Ŝα
)]
aN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
√
2
pi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
E
[∑
α∈Λ;η/∈∆(α,N) (Xα − µ) (Xη − µ) · sign (E [(Xα − µ) (Xη − µ) | (Xη − µ)])
]
aN
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Thus, it is sufficient that
(C.6)
E
 ∑
α∈Λ;η/∈∆(α,N)
(Xα − µ) (Xη − µ) · sign (E [(Xα − µ) (Xη − µ) | (Xη − µ)])
 = o(aN)
to ensure that ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
E
[∑
α∈Λ;η/∈∆(α,N) (Xα − µ) · (Xη − µ) · f ′
(
Ŝα
)]
aN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = o(1).
Note that (C.6) is weaker than (C.3), since if E [(Xα − µ) (Xη − µ) | (Xη − µ)] ≥ 0, then
(using our tie-breaking convention from the lemma)
sign (E [(Xα − µ) (Xη − µ) | (Xη − µ)]) = 1,
and so (C.6) becomes
E
 ∑
α∈Λ;η/∈∆(α,N)
(Xα − µ) (Xη − µ)
 = o(aN),
which is ensured by (C.3).
The second step is to apply the same reasoning as in Ross (2011), with an o(1)
adjustment, to write∣∣∣E [f ′(S)− Sf(S)]∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∣E
[
1
a1/2
∑
α
(Xα − µ) (f(S)− f(Sα)− (S − Sα)f ′(S)
]∣∣∣∣∣
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+
∣∣∣∣∣E
[
f ′(S)
(
1− 1
a1/2
∑
α
(Xα − µ) (S − Sα)
)]∣∣∣∣∣+ o(1).
By a Taylor series approximation and given the bound on the derivatives of f , it follows
that ∣∣∣E [f ′(S)− Sf(S)]∣∣∣ ≤ ||f ′′||2a1/2 ∑α E
[
|Xα − µ|
(
S − Sα
)2]
+
∣∣∣∣∣E
[
f ′(S)
(
1− 1
a1/2
∑
α
(Xα − µ) (S − Sα)
)]∣∣∣∣∣+ o(1).
Let us denote the two terms on the right hand side as A1 and A2 respectively. We
bound each.
A1 =
||f ′′||
2a3/2
∑
α
E
|Xα − µ|
 ∑
η∈∆(α,N)
(Xη − µ)
2

≤ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α
E
Xα
 ∑
η∈∆(α,N)
(Xη − µ)
2

+ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α
E
µ
 ∑
η∈∆(α,N)
(Xη − µ)
2

≤ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
E [Xα (Xη − µ) (Xγ − µ)]
+ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
E [µ (Xη − µ) (Xγ − µ)]
= ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
(
E [XαXηXγ]− µE [Xα, Xη]− µE [Xα, Xγ] + µ2E [Xα]
)
+ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
µcov [Xη, Xγ]
= ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
(
E [XαXηXγ]− µ
(
cov [Xα, Xη] + µ2
)
− µ
(
cov [Xα, Xγ] + µ2
)
+ µ3
)
+ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
µcov [Xη, Xγ]
= ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
(
E [XαXηXγ]− µcov [Xα, Xη]− µcov [Xα, Xγ]− µ3
)
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+ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
µcov [Xη, Xγ]
= ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
E [XαXηXγ]
− ||f
′′||
2a3/2µ(M(N)2aµ+NM(N)
2µ3)
+ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
µcov [Xη, Xγ]
≤ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
E [XαXηXγ]− ||f
′′||
2a3/2 (M(N)aµ+NM(N)
2µ3)
≤ ||f
′′||
2a3/2
∑
α;η∈∆(α,N),γ∈∆(α,N)
E [XαXηXγ] = o(1),
where the last step follows from (C.1).
Similarly
A2 =
∣∣∣∣∣E
[
f ′(S)
(
1− 1
a1/2
∑
α
(Xα − µ) (S − Sα)
)]∣∣∣∣∣
= 1
a
∣∣∣∣∣∣E
f ′(S)
a− ∑
α,η∈∆(α,N)
(Xα − µ) (Xη − µ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ||f
′||
a
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
a− ∑
α,η∈∆(α,N)
(Xα − µ) (Xη − µ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ||f
′||
a
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ∑
α,β∈∆(α,N)
(Xα − µ) (Xβ − µ)− E [(Xα − µ) (Xβ − µ)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
√
2
a
√
pi
var
 ∑
α,β∈∆(α,N)
(Xα − µ) (Xη − µ)
1/2
=
√
2
a
√
pi
 ∑
α,α′,η∈∆(α,N),η′∈∆(α′,N)
cov ((Xα − µ)(Xη − µ), (Xα′ − µ)(Xη′ − µ))
1/2 ,
where the last inequality follows by the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality. Note that the final
expression is o(1) by (C.2).
Proof of Corollary C.1. We apply Theorem C.1 to the case in which ∆(α,N) = {α}.
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In this case, note that (C.1) becomes
∑
α
E
[
X3α
]
= o
(∑
α
var (Xα)
)3/2 .
which is satisfied if
Nµ3 = o
(
N3/2var (Xα)3/2
)
.
or
N−1/3µ2 = o (var (Xα)) .
which is implied by (i).
Next, (C.2) becomes∑
α,α′
cov
(
(Xα − µ)2, (Xα′ − µ)2
)
= o
(
N2Var (Xα)2
)
.
Note that the terms on the left-hand-side where α = α′ are equal to Nvar (Xα)2, and so
are inconsequential to satisfying the equation, and thus it becomes∑
α 6=α′
cov
(
(Xα − µ)2, (Xα′ − µ)2
)
= o
(
N2var (Xα)2
)
,
which is condition (ii).
Finally, (C.3) becomes ∑
α 6=α′
cov (Xα, X ′α) = o (Nvar (Xα)) ,
which is condition (iii).
C.2. Links and Triangles SUGMs. Let the moment (normalized) be
M̂ (β) = RnS (g)− Eβ [RnS (g)] ,
where Rn = diag
{
nhL , nhT
}
properly normalizes the moments. So, for example, for links
we have
M̂nL (β) =
nhL(
n
2
) ∑
i<j
{gij − Eβgij}
= n
hL(
n
2
) ∑
i<j
gij − qL (β)nhL .
The objective function is
Q̂n (g, β) := M̂n (β)′ M̂n (β) .
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And we will need
Qn (β) = E
[
M̂n (β)
]′
E
[
M̂n (β)
]
which is the non-stochastic analogue.
C.2.1. Identification. We already have demonstrated identification but for sequences of
parameters we need identifiable uniqueness in the sense of Lemma 3.1 of Po¨tscher and
Prucha (1997): the parameters βn0 are identifiably unique in the sense that for any ε > 0
liminfn→0
[
infβ∈B: δ(β,βn0 )>ε
∣∣∣Qn (β)−Qn (βn0 )∣∣∣] > 0.
We prove this now.
Proposition C.1. Consider a links and triangles SUGM with associated parameters
βn0,L, β
n
0,T =
(
b0,L
nhL
,
b0,T
nhT
)
with hL > 1/2 and hT ∈ [hL + 1, 3hL), then βn0,L, βn0,T are identi-
fiably unique.
Proof of Proposition C.1.
Write33
βn =
(
bnL
nhL
,
bnT
nhT
)
βn0 =
(
bnL0
nhL
,
bnT0
nhT
)
,
where bnL, bnT , bnL0, bnT0 lie in [D,D]
Let rnL = 1/nhL and rnT = 1/nhT .
First, note that 1− (1− βnT )x is the probability that some link is formed as part of at
least one triangle out of x possible triangles that could have it as an edge (independently
of whether it also forms directly).
Next, note that the probability that a link forms conditional on some particular tri-
angle that it could be a part of not forming is34
(C.7) q˜nL = βnL + (1− βnL)
(
1− (1− βnT )n−3
)
.
So, we can write the probability of some triangle forming as
(C.8) qnT := EβnL,βnT [ST (g)] = β
n
T + (1− βnT )(q˜nL)3,
33We allow the constants to depend on n to capture that some applications have both rates and constants
that adjust with scale, and we may want to fit across data of networks of varying sizes. But this is largely
semantic, as estimating any particular network has only one b, and one can ignore the superscripts on
the bs if one likes.
34That is, consider a given pair of nodes i, j and a third node k. Consider the probability that link ij
is formed conditional on triangle ijk not forming directly as a triangle.
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where the first expression βnT is the probability that the triangle is directly generated,
and then the second expression (1 − βnT )(q˜nL)3 is the probability that it was not gen-
erated directly, but instead all three of the edges formed on their own (which happen
independently, conditional on the triangle not forming, which has probability (q˜nL)3).
It is useful to note that since βnL = o(1), (1−βnL)→ 1 and since hT > 1, (1−βnT )n−3 →
1− bnT0
nhT−1 . Thus,
q˜nL = Θ
( 1
nhL
+ 1
nhT−1
)
= Θ
( 1
nhL
)
where the second equality follows since hT ≥ hL + 1.
Next, note that the probability that a link forms is
(C.9) qnL := EβnL,βnT [SL(g)] = β
n
L + (1− βnL)
(
1− (1− βnT )n−2
)
,
where the first expression βnL is the probability that the link is directly generated, and
then the second expression (1− βnL) (1− (1− βnT )n−2) is the probability that it was not
generated directly, but instead appeared as an edge in some triangle (and there are n−2
such possible triangles).
It is also useful to write this in a very different way:
(C.10) qnL := EβnL,βnT [SL(g)] = β
n
T + (1− βnT )q˜nL,
noting that a link could form as part of a triangle that it is part of, or else form conditional
upon that triangle not forming.
The following derivative expressions are useful:
(C.11) ∂q˜
n
L
∂βnL
= (1− βnT )n−3
∂q˜nL
∂βnT
= (n− 3)(1− βnL)(1− βnT )n−2.
∂qnL
∂βnL
= (1− βnT )n−2.
∂qnT
∂βnL
= 3(1− βnT )(q˜nL)2
∂q˜nL
∂βnL
= 3(q˜nL)2(1− βnT )n−2.
∂qnL
∂βnT
= 1− q˜nL + (1− βnT )
∂q˜nL
∂βnT
= 1− q˜nL + (n− 3)(1− βnL)(1− βnT )n−1.
∂qnT
∂βnT
= 1− (q˜nL)3 + 3(1− βnT )(q˜nL)2
∂q˜nL
∂βnT
= 1− (q˜nL)3 + 3(q˜nL)2(n− 3)(1− βnL)(1− βnT )n−1.
Given that βnL = o(1) (since hL > 0), βnT = o(1/n) (since hT > 1), and q˜nL = Θ
(
1
nhL
)
the above expressions imply that:
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(C.12) ∂q
n
L
∂βnL
= 1− o(1),
(C.13) ∂q
n
T
∂βnL
= Θ
( 1
n2hL
)
,
(C.14) ∂q
n
L
∂βnT
= n− 2− o(1),
(C.15) ∂q
n
T
∂βnT
= Θ
(
max[1, n1−2hL ]
)
.
Note that (C.12)-(C.15) hold for any parameters hL > 0 and 3hL > hT ≥ hL + 1 -
and thus uniformly for any βn in a compact set of such hL, hT , and thus as long as we
restrict attention to βn in that compact set, we have the same order derivatives and so
then we approximate:
(C.16)
Eβn [SL(g)]− Eβn0 [SL(g)]
rnL
≈ nhL
[
bnL − bnL0
nhL
+ (n− 2)b
n
T − bnT0
nhT
]
≈ bnL − bnL0 + (bnT − bnT0)Θ(nhL+1−hT ),
and
(C.17)
Eβn [ST (g)]− Eβn0 [ST (g)]
rnT
≈ nhT
[
bnL − bnL0
nhL
Θ(1/n2hL) + b
n
T − bnT0
nhT
Θ
(
max[1, n1−2hL ]
)]
≈ (bnL − bnL0)Θ(nhT−3hL) + (bnT − bnT0)Θ
(
max[1, n1−2hL ]
)
.
To establish identifiable uniqueness (given the additive separability of Qn(β) across
U, T ) it is sufficient to argue that for any ε > 0 there exists φ > 0 such that for large
enough n, if δ((βnL, βnT ), (βn0,L, βn0,T )) > ε, then at least one of the following inequalities
holds:
(C.18)
∣∣∣∣∣Eβn [SL(g)]− Eβn0 [SL(g)]rnL
∣∣∣∣∣ > φ
or
(C.19)
∣∣∣∣∣Eβn [ST (g)]− Eβn0 [ST (g)]rnT
∣∣∣∣∣ > φ.
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Note that δ((βnL, βnT ), (βn0,L, βn0,T )) > ε translates into |bnL−bn0,L| > cε and/or |bnT−bn0,T | >
cε for some c > 0. If the second inequality holds, then by (C.17) it follows that (C.19)
holds. If (C.19) does not hold for any φ, then by (C.17) it must be that |bnL − bn0,L| > cε
while |bnT − bn0,T | < δn for a sequence δn → 0. In that case, noting that since hT ≥ hL− 1
(and so the second term of (C.16) is of order at most 1 times δn while the first term is
at least cε in magnitude), then by (C.16) it follows that (C.18) holds.
C.2.2. Consistency.
Proposition C.2. Consider a links and triangles SUGM with 2 > hL > 1/2 and
hT ∈ [hL + 1,min{3hL, 3}). Then δ(β̂, βn0 ) P−→ 0.
Proof of Proposition C.2. The proof follows from checking the condition of Lemma
3.1 of Po¨tscher and Prucha (1997) (see also Jenish and Prucha (2009)). Clearly B is
compact, the weighting function is the identity matrix so it is positive semi-definite, and
the moment function is continuous in β. Identifiable uniqueness was demonstrated in
Proposition C.1. Uniform convergence of the objective function comes from checking a
Lipschitz condition.
The first thing to observe is that this just requires showing
sup
β
∣∣∣M̂n (β)− EM̂n (β)∣∣∣ = op (1) .
This is because
sup
β
∣∣∣Q̂n (g, β)−Qn (β)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
β
∣∣∣∣M̂n (β)′ M̂n (β)− E [M̂n (β)]′E [M̂n (β)]∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
β
∣∣∣∣{M̂n (β)− E [M̂n (β)]}′ M̂n (β)∣∣∣∣
+ sup
β
∣∣∣∣E [M̂n (β)]′ {M̂n (β)− E [M̂n (β)]}∣∣∣∣
≤ 2K · sup
β
∣∣∣M̂n (β)− E [M̂n (β)]∣∣∣
for a constant K, recalling we have assumed DL < bL < DL and DT < bT < DT .
So, we show that supβ
∣∣∣M̂n (β)− EM̂n (β)∣∣∣ = op (1) . It is enough to show pointwise
convergence, which is clear by inspection, and stochastic equicontinuity.
Stochastic equicontinuity requires
P
{
sup
β
sup
β′∈δ(β,β′)<η
∣∣∣M̂n (β)− M̂n (β′)∣∣∣ > } < .
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A sufficient condition is a Lipschitz condition:∣∣∣M̂ (β)− M̂ (β′)∣∣∣ = Op (1) · δ (β, β′) .
We now show this condition. Recall that ∆ = hT − hL. It is also useful to note (see
the proof of Proposition C.1) that
|qnL (β)− qnL (β′)| ≤ (1 + o (1)) |βL − β′L|+ Θ (n) |βT − β′T |
and
|qnT (β)− qnT (β′)| ≤ Θ
(
n−2hL
)
|βL − β′L|+ Θ (1) |βT − β′T | .
Returning to the moments computation:∣∣∣M̂ (β)− M̂ (β′)∣∣∣ ≤ nhL |qL (β)− qL (β′)|+ nhT |qT (β)− qT (β′)|
≤ (1 + o (1)) |βL − β′L|nhL + Θ (n) |βT − β′T |nhL
+ Θ
(
n−2hL
)
|βL − β′L|nhT + Θ (1) |βT − β′T |nhT
≤ Θ (1) δL (βL, β′L) + Θ
(
n1−∆
)
δT (βT , β′T )
+ Θ
(
nhT−3hL
)
δL (βL, β′L) + Θ (1) δT (βT , β′T )
≤ Θ (1) δ (β, β′)
since ∆ > 1 and hT < 3hL, which proves the result.
C.2.3. Asymptotic Normality.
Proof of Proposition 4.
The proof of the result follows the outline of standard results on asymptotic normality
of parameter estimates (e.g., Newey and McFadden (1994)).
It is convenient to normalize things via a change of variables via the diagonal normal-
izing matrix Rn = diag{nhL , nhT } to a parameter vector b := Rnβ, so that the magnitude
of the parameter vector does not change with n. Observe that δ
(
β̂, βn0
) P−→ 0 if and only
if b̂ P−→ b0, and consistency in the δ-metric holds by Proposition C.2.
It is also useful to then define the expected and empirical moment functions in terms
of this rescaled parameter
M̂L (b) =
 nhL(
n
mL
) ∑
i<j
gij − qL (bL, bT )

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and
M̂T (b) =
 nhT(
n
mT
) ∑
i<j<k
gijgjkgik − qT (bL, bT )

where qL(b) = nhLqL and qT (b) = nhT qT are the normalized expectations given parameter
(bL, bT ) = Rnβ.
Let ∆ = hT − hL. We treat two separate cases, ∆ > 1 and ∆ = 1. The second case
allows links to generate triangles at a similar rate as triangles, and so is a more complex
case to treat, and so each step of the argument involves different arguments for the two
cases.
From the first order condition of GMM estimation, we take a mean value expansion
around the true normalized parameter b0 by applying the mean-value theorem, and then
solve for b̂ − b0.35 Note that the mean value b is evaluated component by component
in the matrix ∇M̂
(
b
)
. This abuse of notation is standard (e.g., Newey and McFadden
(1994)).
Rn
(
β̂ − β0
)
=
(
b̂− b0
)
= −
[
∇M̂
(
b̂
)′∇M̂ (b)]−1∇M̂ (b̂)′ M̂ (b0) .
Below we will show that for ∆ > 1
−
[
∇M̂
(
b̂
)′∇M̂ (b)]−1∇M̂ (b̂)′ P−→ I
and by Lemma C.4, for
Vn =
 var(nhLSL) cov(nhLSL, nhTST )
cov(nhLSL, nhTST ) var(nhTST )

it follows that
V −1/2n M̂ (b0) N (0, I) .
Therefore by Slutzky’s theorem, it follows that
V −1/2n Rn
(
β̂ − β0
)
 N (0, I) .
Thus, to complete the proof for the case of ∆ > 1, it suffices to show that
−
[
∇M̂
(
b̂
)′∇M̂ (b)]−1∇M̂ (b̂)′ P−→ I
35This is valid because b0 is assumed to lie in the interior of B, a compact set, which then implies the
sequence of Bn under consideration.
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For the case of ∆ = 1 we will end up with a different expression for the limit of
−
[
∇M̂
(
b̂
)′∇M̂ (b)]−1∇M̂ (b̂)′ and so will have a different covariance and normaliza-
tion.
To find the limit of these gradient terms, we need to compute ∇q, where we define
qL (b) := nhL [qL (β)]
= nhL
[
βL + (1− βL)
[
1− (1− βT )n−2
]]
= bL +
(
nhL − bL
)
(n− 2) · bT
nhT
= bL +
bT
nhT−hL−1
+ o (1) .
Similarly
qT (b) := nhT [qT (β)]
= nhT
[
βT + (1− βT )
{
βL + (1− βL)
[
1− (1− βT )n−2
]}3]
= bT +
(
nhT − bT
){ bL
nhL
+ bT
nhT−1
− bT
nhT+hL−1
bL
}3
= bT +

bL
nhL−hT /3
+ bT
n2hT /3−1
− bT
nhT+hL−1−hT /3
bL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:x

3
.
Note that the third term will always be of lesser order, so
x = O
({
bL
nhL−hT /3
+ bT
n2hT /3−1
})
.
Also notice
hL − hT/3 < 2hT/3− 1 ⇐⇒ ∆ > 1.
Thus, if ∆ > 1 only the first term in x matters, while if ∆ = 1 then the two terms are
of the same order.
Finally it will be useful to write
∇qL =
 1 + o (1)
n1−∆ + o
(
n1−∆
) 
and
∇qT =
 3x2 ( 1nhL−hT /3 (1 + o(1)))
1 + 3x2
(
1
n2hT /3−1 (1 + o(1))
)  .
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Consider the case where ∆ > 1. Then
∇qL =
 1 + o (1)
n1−∆ + o
(
n1−∆
)  =
 1 + o (1)
o (1)

and
∇qT =
 o (1)
1 + o (1)
 ,
since 3hL > hT and hT > 32 .
Now consider the case where ∆ = 1. Again
∇qT =
 o (1)
1 + o (1)

but in this case
∇qL =
 1 + o (1)
n1−∆ + o
(
n1−∆
)  =
 1 + o (1)
1 + o (1)
 .
Notice that q(b) is a continuously differentiable function of b ∈ B, where B is compact,
and ∇bq(b) has a bounded derivative. This allows us to write
∇M̂(b̂) = ∇M̂(b0) + op(1) = −∇q(b0) + op(1).
We explicitly compute the inverse of ∇q(b)′∇q(b) below, which exists.
If ∆ > 1 we can write
−∇M̂ (b) =
 ∂qL∂bL ∂qL∂bT
∂qT
∂bL
∂qT
∂bT
 =
 1 + o (1) o (1)
o (1) 1 + o (1)

and if ∆ = 1 we can write
−∇M̂ (b) =
 ∂qL∂bL ∂qL∂bT
∂qT
∂bL
∂qT
∂bT
 =
 1 + o (1) 1 + o (1)
o (1) 1 + o (1)
 .
We can also compute
∇M̂ (b)′∇M̂ (b) =
 ∂qL∂bL ∂qT∂bL
∂qL
∂bT
∂qT
∂bT
 ∂qL∂bL ∂qL∂bT
∂qT
∂bL
∂qT
∂bT

=

(
∂qL
∂bL
)2
+
(
∂qT
∂bL
)2 ∂qL
∂bL
∂qL
∂bT
+ ∂qL
∂bT
∂qT
∂bT
∂qL
∂bL
∂qL
∂bT
+ ∂qT
∂bL
∂qT
∂bT
(
∂qL
∂bT
)2
+
(
∂qT
∂bT
)2

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and so the inverse is
[
∇M̂ (b)′∇M̂ (b)
]−1
= 1
det
[
∇M̂ (b)′∇M̂ (b)
]

(
∂qL
∂bT
)2
+
(
∂qT
∂bT
)2 − [∂qL
∂bL
∂qL
∂bT
+ ∂qL
∂bT
∂qT
∂bT
]
−
[
∂qL
∂bL
∂qL
∂bT
+ ∂qT
∂bL
∂qT
∂bT
] (
∂qL
∂bL
)2
+
(
∂qT
∂bL
)2
 .
The determinant is given by
det
[
∇M̂ (b)′∇M̂ (b)
]
=
(∂qL
∂bT
)2
+
(
∂qT
∂bT
)2 (∂qL
∂bL
)2
+
(
∂qT
∂bL
)2
−
[
∂qL
∂bL
∂qL
∂bT
+ ∂qT
∂bL
∂qT
∂bT
]2
=
(
∂qL
∂bL
∂qT
∂bT
− ∂qT
∂bL
∂qL
∂bT
)2
.
If ∆ > 1 then the determinant is 1 + o (1) . If ∆ = 1 it is the same.
So the inverse is, if ∆ > 1,
[
∇M̂ (b)′∇M̂ (b)
]−1
= 11 + o (1)
 1 + o (1) o (1)
o (1) 1 + o (1)
 .
We can compute the final object in the case ∆ > 1 as
−
[
∇M̂ (b0)′∇M̂ (b0)
]−1∇M̂ (b0)′ = 11 + o (1)
 1 + o (1) o (1)
o (1) 1 + o (1)
 1 + o (1) o (1)
o (1) 1 + o (1)

=
 1 + o (1) o (1)
o (1) 1 + o (1)
 P−→ I,
which completes the argument for the case of ∆ > 1.
Meanwhile if ∆ = 1 then the inverse is[
∇M̂ (b)′∇M̂ (b)
]−1
= 11 + o (1)
 2 + o (1) −1 + o (1)
−1 + o (1) 1 + o (1)
 .
Therefore,
−
[
∇M̂ (b0)′∇M̂ (b0)
]−1∇M̂ (b0)′ = 11 + o (1)
 2 + o (1) −1 + o (1)
−1 + o (1) 1 + o (1)
 1 + o (1) o (1)
1 + o (1) 1 + o (1)

=
 −1 + o (1) −2 + o (1)
o (1) 1 + o (1)
 P−→
 1 −1
0 1

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Now consider the case with ∆ = 1. In this case since n2−hL = n3−hT , it follows from
our calculations above that
√
n2−hLRn
(
β̂ − β0
)
=
√
n2−hL
 1 −1
0 1

 n
hL
(n2)
∑
gij − qL (b0)
nhT
(n3)
∑
gijgikgjk − qT (b0)

=
√
n2−hL
 {n
hL
(n2)
∑
gij − qL (b0)} − {n
hT
(n3)
∑
gijgikgjk − qT (b0)}
nhT
(n3)
∑
gijgikgjk − qT (b0) .
 ,
which still jointly converge to a mean zero random variable, but with a different variance-
covariance matrix:
Vn =
 var(nhLSL − nhTST ) cov(nhLSL − nhTST , nhTST )
cov(nhLSL − nhTST , nhTST ) var(nhTST )

for the ∆ = 1 case.
Lemma C.4. Consider a links and triangles SUGM with associated parameters βn0,L, βn0,T =(
b0,L
nhL
,
b0,T
nhT
)
such that
2 > hL > 1/2 and min[3, 5hL − 1] > hT > hL + 1
or
2 > hL > 1 and 3 > hT > 2.
Then the model satisfies the conditions of Theorem C.1, so
V −1/2n

nhL
( nmL)
∑
i<j {gij − Egij}
nhT
( nmT )
∑
i<j<k {gijgjkgik − Egijgjkgik}
 N (0, I)
where
Vn =
 var(nhLSL) cov(nhLSL, nhTST )
cov(nhLSL, nhTST ) var(nhTST )
 .
Proof of Lemma C.4.
Our proof uses Theorem C.1 directly to establish that the conditions hold for the
statistic SL(g), and then we use Corollary C.1 to establish that the conditions hold for
the statistic ST (g).
First, note that our maintained assumption that aN → ∞ requires that hL < 2 and
hT < 3.
SL case:
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In this case, α refers to a generic link ij.
We first apply the theorem letting ∆
(
α,
(
n
2
))
= {η : η ∩ α 6= ∅}, so ∆(ij, N) =
{ij} ∪ {ik|k 6= i, j} ∪ {jk|k 6= i, j}. After that we will apply the corollary. Each covers
different parameter intervals.
Applying Theorem C.1: So, for the application of the theorem, ∆ includes the link ij
itself, as well as adjacent links, ik and jk, for k 6= i, j. We show that the conditions for
Theorem C.1 hold.
(C.3) is obvious from the definition of ∆
(
ij,
(
n
2
))
, because if ij and kl do not share
nodes then no triangle (nor any link) could generate both, and so they are independent
and the left hand side term is then 0.
Next we verify (C.1). Consider the product
E |XαXηXγ|
for η, γ ∈ ∆ (α,N). There are several cases to consider. The first three are cases in
which α, η, γ are distinct and the last two handle cases in which two or more of these are
the same link. In each case the letters i, j, k, l are distinct generic nodes, and α could
be any one of the links
[1 ]: ij, jk, il (a line) - there are order n4 of these.
[2 ]: ij, ik, il (a star) - there are order n4 of these.
[3 ]: ij, jk, ik (a triangle) - there are order n3 of these.
[4 ]: ij, ij, jk or ij, jk, jk, two of the links repeat - there are order n3 of these.
[5 ]: ij, ij, ij all of the links repeat - there are order n2 of these.
Note that
E |XαXηXγ| = P (XαXηXγ = 1) ,
which we now bound in each case.
From the proof of Proposition C.1, recall that qnL is the probability of a link forming
in the graph which can be due to a link forming directly or as a part of a triangle, and q˜nL
is the probability of a link forming if a particular triangle that it could be part of does
not form. Let q˜′L denote the probability that a link forms conditional on two triangles
that it could be part of not forming.
It is useful to suppress the n subscripts unless explicitly needed. Then loose upper
bounds on the probabilities of the various structures are
• for [1]: β20,T + 2(1− β0,T )β0,T q˜L + (1− β0,T )2q˜2Lq˜′L ≤ β20,T + 2β0,T qL + q3L,
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• for [2]: β30,T + 3(1 − β0,T )β20,T + 3(1 − β0,T )2β0,T q˜′L + (1 − β0,T )3(q˜′L)3 ≤ 4β20,T +
3β0,T qL + q3L,
• for [3]: β0,T + (1− β0,T )(q˜′L)3 ≤ β0,T + q3L,
• for [4]: β0,T + (1− β0,T )(q˜′L)2 ≤ β0,T + q2L
• for [5]: qL
Thus, from the numbers and bounds on probabilities, it follows that
(C.20) E |XαXηXγ| ≤ Θ(n4(β20,T + β0,T qL + q3L) + n3(β0,T + q2L) + n2qL).
Next, note that straightforward calculations show that for k 6= i
(C.21) cov(Xij, Xjk) = β0,T (1− β0,T )(1− q˜L)2 ≈ β0,T .
It then follows directly that
aN = Θ
(
n2qL + n3β0,T
)
.
Now we can compare our expression for E |XαXηXγ| from (C.20) to
o(a3/2N ) = o
(
n3q
3/2
L + n9/2β
3/2
0,T
)
,
to check the condition.
This imposes a number of constraints (omitting the ones that are obviously satisfied,
such as n4β20,T + n3q2L = o(n3q
3/2
L + n9/2β
3/2
0,T )):
(C.22) n4β0,T qL + n4q3L + n3β0,T + n2qL = o(n3q
3/2
L + n9/2β
3/2
0,T ),
Noting, that as in the proof of Proposition C.1, (working there with q˜nL, which is of the
same order)
qnL = Θ
( 1
nhL
+ 1
nhT−1
)
.
it follows that
o
(
n3q
3/2
L + n9/2β
3/2
0,T
)
= o
(
n3−(3/2)hL + n9/2−(3/2)hT
)
.
Thus, (C.22) becomes
max[4− hT −min[hL, hT − 1], 4− 3 min[hL, hT − 1], 3− hT , 2−min[hL, hT − 1]]
< max[3− (3/2)hL, 9/2− (3/2)hT ],
We break this into two cases: If hL ≥ hT−1 then this is satisfied whenever hT ∈ (5/3, 3).
If hL < hT−1 then this is satisfied whenever hL ∈ (2/3, 2) and hT > max[(3/2)hL, hL+1].
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Next, we turn to (C.2). We compute terms of the form
cov ((gij − qL) (gjk − qL) , (grs − qL) (gst − qL)) .
since η ∈ ∆ (α,N) and η′ ∈ ∆ (α′, N), where here we allow for the cases that k = i and
r = t. Iterating on the expectations, one can show that
cov ((gij − qL) (gjk − qL) , (grs − qL) (gst − qL)) ≤ E (gijgjkgrsgst) .
It is easy to see that if {i, j, k}∩{r, s, t} = ∅, then the covariance is zero since the events
are independent. Thus, we are summing over cases in which the intersection is nonempty.
The cases with intersection of two or more nodes are handled as we already did above,
noting that the condition is less restrictive here (note that aN > 1, so a2N > a
3/2
N ).
So, we restrict attention to the cases in which there is only one node of intersection. In
this case the intersection could come from (1) s = j, so we are looking at two two-stars
that are joined at the center, (2) i = r so we are looking at a line, or (3) s = i, where the
center of one star is attached to the leaf of the other. These exhaust all configurations
up to a relabeling. Consider the event that gijgjkgrsgst = 1 and say we are in case 1.
This has the highest probability relative to the other two cases, so we can construct a
crude bound using this. This probability is of order no more than:
β30,T + β20,T qL + β0,T q2L + q3L
So, we need to check that
n5(β30,T + β20,T qL + β0,T q2L + q3L) = o
(
n4q2L + n6β20,T
)
It is sufficient that
nβ20,T qL = o
(
q2L + n2β20,T
)
, nβ0,T q
2
L = o
(
q2L + n2β20,T
)
nq3L = o
(
q2L + n2β20,T
)
These conditions become:
max[1−2hT−min[hL, hT−1], 1−hT−2 min[hL, hT−1], 1−3hL, 4−3hT ] < max[−2hL, 2−2hT ]
We break this into two cases: If hL ≥ hT − 1 then this is satisfied whenever
hL + 1 ≥ hT , hT ∈ (2, 1/2 + (3/2)hL).
If hL < hT − 1 then this is satisfied whenever
hL > 1, hT > max[(2/3)hL + 4/3, hL + 1].
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Note that the first case requires that hL > 1. Also, then hL + 1 < 1/2 + (3/2)hL, and
so the first case becomes hL > 1 and hT ∈ (2, hL + 1). Next, note, that when hL > 1,
(2/3)hL + 4/3 < hL + 1 and so the second case becomes hL > 1, hT > hL + 1.
Thus, overall the conditions are thus that hL ∈ (1, 2) and hT ∈ (2, 3).
Applying Corollary C.1: Next, let us analyze the conditions imposed by the corollary.
Condition (i) is straightforward, since var(Xα) = µ(1 − µ) for a Bernoulli random
variable.
Condition (iii) is verified by checking that (noting our expression for cov(Xij, Xjk)
above and that var(Xα) = µ(1− µ) ≈ qL):∑
α 6=η
cov(Xα, Xη) ≈ n3βT = o(n2qL)
which is satisfied whenever hL < hT − 1.
It is also easy to check that (ii) holds whenever (iii) does. In particular, note that∑
α 6=η
cov((Xα − µ)2, (Xη − µ)2) = E[(X2α − 2Xαµ+ µ2)(X2η − 2Xηµ+ µ2)]
and, since for a Bernoulli random variable X2α = Xα, this becomes∑
α 6=η
cov((Xα − µ)2, (Xη − µ)2) = E[(Xα(1− 2µ) + µ2)(Xη(1− 2µ) + µ2)]
= E[XαXη − µ2] +O(µ3) ≈ cov(Xα, Xη).
Thus, (ii) is satisfied whenever (iii) is (and note that aN ≥ 1 so a2N ≥ aN).
Therefore, again, re-summarizing all of the conditions together, to get asymptotic
normality for the links statistics is sufficient that either
2 > hL > 0 and 3 > hT > hL + 1
or
2 > hL > 1 and 3 > hT > 2.
ST case: Set ∆
(
ijk,
(
n
2
))
= {ijk} and we apply Corollary C.1.
Condition (i) follows from the fact that since µ ≤ 1/2 for large enough N , var(Xα) =
µ(1− µ) ≥ µ2 ≥ µ2N−1/3+ε.
Condition (ii) is implied by condition (iii), below, just as argued above.
So we check condition (iii):∑
α 6=η
cov (Xα, Xη) = o (N · var (Xα)) .
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To see this first observe that (again, noting that Xα is Bernoulli):
var (Xα) = qT (1− qT ) = β0,T (1 + o(1)),
which follows from the proof of Proposition C.1.
We compute cov (Xα, Xη) for various cases of α, η as a function of how many nodes
the two triangles have in their intersection:
• |α ∩ η| = 0: cov (Xα, Xη) = 0 by independence.
• |α ∩ η| = 1: cov (Xα, Xη) = O (β0,T · q4L). There are O (n5) of these.
– This is because we need at least one link from each triangle to have formed
together and not have already formed independently, which can happen only
if the joint node is part of a triangle, and neither of the triangles formed
directly. This gives us β0,T q˜4L ≤ β0,T q4L.
• |α ∩ η| = 2: cov (Xα, Xη) = O (β0,T q2L + q5L).
– This is because we need the common link from each triangle to have formed
together and not have already formed independently in both cases, which
can happen only if exactly one of the triangles formed directly and the other
did not, or else neither triangle to have formed and all of the links to have
formed. This is of order β0,T q˜2L + (q˜′L)5 ≤ β0,T q2L + q5L.
There are O (n4) of these.
Thus, it must be that
n5β0,T q
4
L + n4(β0,T q2L + q5L) = o
(
n3β0,T
)
.
These conditions become hL > 1/2 and hT < 5hL − 1.
If we put all of the conditions together from both the links and the triangles, we end
up with either
2 > hL > 1/2 and min[3, 5hL − 1] > hT > hL + 1
or
2 > hL > 1 and 3 > hT > 2.
which completes the proof.
C.2.4. Simulations.
We illustrate the consistency of the estimators of links and triangles example via some
simulations.
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We set n = 500 and run 500 simulations of generating a network under the SUGM
and then calculating the estimates for each of 20 parameter values for (βn0,L, βn0,T ):
βn0,L =
b0
n1.1
and βn0,T =
3b0
n2.1
with b0 ∈ {.5, 1, ..., 9.5, 20}. This generates networks with expected degrees ranging
between 2 and 50 and for parsimony guarantees that on average the number of links
generated directly and by triangles are similar.
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Figure 11. Estimates of β̂L and β̂T across 500 simulations for β0,L, β0,T .
Figure 11 presents the results. We see that for the sparse case the direct estimator
and GMM do well, but as density increases only the GMM estimator remains accurate.
With larger n, the sparse estimator does well for wider ranges of parameters.
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Appendix D. Direct Estimation of Sparse Networks
We use the following convention in ordering the counting of statistics.
D.1. A Convention for Counting Subgraphs in Sparse Networks.
Consider a SUGM and order the classes of the subgraphs, G1, . . . , G`, . . . , Gk, from
‘largest’ to ‘smallest’. In particular, we choose the ordering of 1, . . . , k so that a subgraph
in Gn` cannot be a subnetwork of the subnetworks in Gn`′ for k ≥ `′ > ` ≥ 1:
g` ∈ Gn` and g`′ ∈ Gn`′ implies that g` 6⊂ g`′ .
There exists at least one such ordering - for instance, any ordering in which subgraphs
with more links are counted before subgraphs with fewer links. In an example with
links, 2-stars and triangles: triangles precede 2-stars which precede links. Note that this
is a partial order: for instance, a ‘three link line’ ij, jk, kl is neither a subgraph nor a
supergraph of a ‘3-star’ ij, ik, il, which is also a three link subgraph on four nodes. It is
irrelevant in which order subgraphs with the same number of links are counted.
So, we count subgraphs in this order, and after having removed links associated with
all of the subgraphs already counted, denoted S˜n` :36
S˜n` (g) = |{g` ∈ Gn` : g` ⊂ g and g` 6 ∩g`′′ for any g`′′ ∈ Gn`′′ such that g`′′ ⊂ g for some `′′ < `}|.
D.2. Direct Parameter Estimation.
To define the direct parameter estimates, β˜s, from the counts, we then need to divide
by the number of possible subgraphs that could exist on the remaining pairs of nodes
after having removed the larger subgraphs. In particular, let r˜n` (g) denote the number of
potential remaining subgraphs of type ` exist after removing all those of types `′′ < `:37
r˜n` (g) = |{g` ∈ Gn` : g` 6 ∩g`′′ for any g`′′ ∈ Gn`′′ such that g`′′ ⊂ g for some `′′ < `}|.
In our links and triangles example, then r˜nT (g) =
(
n
3
)
and r˜nU(g) =
(
n
2
)
− L(S˜T (g))
where L(S˜T (g)) is the number of links that are part of triangles in g. Typically, in
sparse networks, the adjustments of the denominators to account for the deletion of
links already in larger subgraphs will be inconsequential (see the proof of Proposition
36Note in terms of the notation here, counting in order from ‘largest’ to ‘smallest’ subnetworks means
that we count things from smallest to largest index `: so the specification of how we ordered labels
moves in the opposite direction of the size of the subgraphs.
37This ignores the fact that not all of these could be formed without incidentally generating more larger
networks. For instance, with links and triangles on 4 nodes, if we remove triangle 123, we are left with
links 14, 24, 34, and at most one of those could form without incidentally generating another triangle.
This bias will disappear in the sparse case with large number of links.
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D.1 below). For instance, there are relatively few triangles relative to what could be
present and not many links will be lost to triangles.38
The direct estimator β˜n is then
(D.1) β˜n` =
S˜n` (g)
r˜n` (g)
.
For example, in a links and triangles model, direct estimators are(
β˜T , β˜L
)
=
(
# of triangles
# of triples of nodes ,
# of links not in triangles
# of pairs of nodes that are not already together in some triangle
)
.
As we prove, under a sparsity condition these direct estimators are consistent estimates
of the true parameters, and they are asymptotically Normally distributed.
As an illustration, consider Figure 12 in which links and triangles are formed on 41
nodes. There are 9 truly generated triangles, but 10 observed overall. So, the frequency
of triangles, S˜nT (g), is overestimated by using 10 instead of 9. The true frequency was
9/10660 but is estimated as 10/10660.
With respect to links, there were actually 25 truly directly generated, but one becomes
part of an incidentally generated triangle and two others overlap on existing triangles,
and so S˜nL(g) becomes 22 instead. Here we count them just out of the 820 − 30 = 790
remaining pairs of nodes that are not in triangles, so we estimate 22/790 while the true
frequency was 25/820.
D.3. Generating Classes.
To define sparsity, we have to track how many ways a potential subnetwork g′ ∈ Gn`
could be incidentally generated, many of the ways being equivalent up to relabelings. For
instance, many different combinations of triangles and edges could incidentally generate
a triangle g′ = {12, 23, 31}. However, notice that there are only eight ways in which it
can be done if we ignore the labels of the nodes outside of g′: link 12 could be generated
either by a triangle or link, and same for links 23 and 31, leading to 23 = 8 ways in
which this could happen.
We first provide a precise specification of what it means to be incidentally generated.
We say that a subgraph g′ ∈ G` for some ` can be incidentally generated by the subgraphs
{gj}j∈J , indexed by J , if g′ ⊂ ∪j∈Jgj.
38This does not mean that we can simply do away with our ordered-counting convention entirely - as
the presence of directly formed links could still be of a similar order as the presence of links in triangles,
it is just that both are relatively rare. So, the adjustments in the numerator associated with counting
subgraphs are essential, while the ones in the denominator to track how many could have been present
are not essential, but improve small-sample accuracy.
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(a) n nodes (b) Triangles form
(c) Links form (d) Resulting network
Figure 12. A network is formed on 41 nodes and is shown in panel D.
The process can be thought of as first forming triangles as in (B), and
links as in (C). Note that two links form on triangles, and a third link
incidentally generates an extra triangle. In this network we would count
S˜nT (g) = 10, and S˜nL(g) = 22 from (D), while the true process generated
9 triangles and 23 links directly. The estimates become β˜nT = 1010660 , and
β˜nL = 22790 , while the true frequencies were
9
10660 and
25
820 .
Consider any potential subgraph g′ ∈ Gn` that can be incidentally generated by a set
of subnetworks {gj}j∈J with associated indices `j and also by another set {gj′}j′∈J ′ . We
say that {gj}j∈J and {gj′}j′∈J ′ are equivalent generators of g′ if there exists a bijection pi
from J to J ′ such that `j = `pi(j) and |gj ∩ g′| = |gpi(j) ∩ g′|. So the equivalent generating
sets have the same configurations in terms of numbers and types of subgraphs, and in
terms of how many nodes each of those subgraphs intersects the given network.
So, for instance a triangle 123, could be incidentally generated by links 12, 23, and
triangle 134; and an equivalent generator is links 12, 23, and triangle 135, and another
is links 23, 13; and triangle 128, and so forth.
Given this equivalence relation, ignoring the specific labels of subgraphs we can define
generating classes for any type of subgraph G`. We just keep track of the number and
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type of subgraphs needed, as well as how many nodes each has subgraph intersecting
with the given incidentally generated subgraph.
So, each generating class C of someGn` is a list C = (`1, c1, . . . , `C , cC) consisting of a list
of types of subgraphs used for the incidental generation and how many nodes each has in-
tersecting with the given incidentally generated subgraph. Thus, C = (`1, c1, . . . , `C , cC)
is such that there ∃g′ ∈ Gn` generated by some {gj}j∈J for which |J | = C and for each
j: gj ∈ Gn`j and cj = |gj ∩ g′|.
We order generating classes so that the indices are ordered: `j ≤ `j+1, and lexico-
graphically cj ≤ cj+1 whenever `j = `j+1. This ensures that we avoid counting the same
class twice.39
We only need to work with a small set of generating classes, so we restrict attention
to the following:
• generating classes that are minimal: in the above J there cannot be j′ such that
g′ ⊂ ∪j∈J,j 6=j′gj, and
• generating classes that only involve smaller subgraphs: `j ≥ ` for all j ∈ J .
The second condition states that we can ignore many generating classes because of
our counting convention: when counting any given subgraph type, we only have to worry
about incidental generation by the remaining (weakly smaller) subgraphs.
So, for a links and triangles example, where Gn = (GnT , GnL) are triangles and links,
there are four generating classes of a triangle: a triangle could be incidentally generated
by three other triangles, two triangles and one link, two links and one triangle, or three
links.40 Under the last condition above, there are no generating classes for links to
worry about, since they cannot be incidentally generated by themselves and we only
count them after removing all triangles.
D.4. Relative Sparsity.
39 However, a generating class of two links and a triangle is a different generating class than one link
and two triangles - this numbering just avoids the double counting of two links and a triangle separately
from a triangle and two links.
40Here, then we would represent a generating class of two triangles and a link as (T, 2;T, 2;L, 2), where
this indicates that two triangles were involved and each intersected the subgraph in question in two
nodes and then L, 2 indicates that a link was involved intersecting the subgraph in two nodes.
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Consider a set of (ordered) subgraphs Gn = (Gn1 , . . . , Gnk) and any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
any generating class of some `, C = (`1, c1; . . . ; `C , cC). Let41
MC = (
∑
j=1,...,C
cj)−m`.
For example, in forming a triangle from any combination of triangles and links, each
cj = 2 and so MC = 6− 3 = 3.
We say that a sequence SUGMs with associated (ordered) subgraphsGn = (Gn1 , . . . , Gnk)
and parameters βn0 is relatively sparse if and for each `:
βn0,` → 0,
and for each associated generating class C with associated (`j, cj)j∈1,...,C :∏
j∈1,...,C Eβn0 (S
n
`j
(g))
nMCEβn0 (S
n
` (g))
→ 0,
and ∏
j∈1,...,C Eβn0 (S
n
`j
(g))
nMCEβn0 (S
n
`j′
(g)) → 0,
for each j′ ∈ 1, . . . , C. Note that this condition applies to the actual frequencies of sub-
graphs Sn` - a condition on primitives - rather than the directly counted subgraphs S˜n` ,
although the condition turns out to be equivalent when it holds. This is a condition that
provides us with the necessary bounds the relative frequency with which subgraphs are
incidentally generated (the numerator) compared to directly generated (the denomina-
tor). It applies in two ways: one is that new graphs are not being incidentally generated
at too fast a rate, and secondly, that given subgraphs are not disappearing into inciden-
tally generated larger subgraphs at too fast a rate. Although notationally complex, they
are easily checked with links and triangles, for instance if βL = bL/n and βT = bT/n2,
or for many other values.42
D.5. Estimation of Sparse Models.
In order to have δ
(
β˜n` , β
n
0,`
) P−→ 0, beyond the network being relatively sparse, it must
also be that the potential number of observations of a particular kind of subgraph grows
41Note that MC ≥ 1 since C ≥ 2 and some set of cj nodes intersects with at least one other set
of cj′ nodes for some j′ 6= j (noting that the incidentally generated subgraph is not a collection of
disconnected links). Recall that under the ordering, lower-indexed subgraphs cannot be generated as a
subset of some single higher-indexed one.
42 Again, we emphasize that many empirical applications have degrees that are fairly constant with
network size, and βL = bL/n and βT = bT /n2 covers a case in which nodes have expected degree roughly
bL + bT /2 irrespective of how large the network grows.
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as n grows. For instance, if nodes have different characteristics (say some demographics),
and we are counting triangles and links by node types, then it also has to be that the
number of nodes that have each demographic grows as n grows. If there were never more
than 5 nodes with some demographic, then we cannot get an accurate estimate of link
formation among those nodes.
We say a SUGM is growing if the probability that S˜n` (g)→∞ for each ` goes to 1.
Proposition D.1 (Consistency and Asymptotic Normality of Direct Estimators of
Sparse SUGMs). Consider a sequence of growing and relatively sparse SUGMs with
associated subgraph statistics S˜n = (S˜n1 , . . . , S˜nk ) and parameters βn0 = (βn0,1, . . . , βn0,k).
Consider the direct estimator β˜ described above. Then
(1) δ(β˜n, βn0 )
P−→ 0 and
(2) Σ−1/2(β˜n−βn0 ) N (0, I) where Σ`,` =
βn0,`(1−βn0,`)
κ`( nm`)
and the off-diagonals are all 0.
Proposition D.1 states that growing and relatively sparse SUGMs are consistently
estimable via a very simple estimation technique that is easily computable.
The proof of the proposition involves showing that, under the growing and sparsity
conditions, the fraction of incidentally generated subnetworks vanishes for each `, and
the observed counts of subnetworks converge to the truly generated ones. And then,
by a standard limiting argument applied to the truly generated subgraphs (which are
independent), the appropriately normalized vector of subgraph counts are asymptotically
normally distributed (with an approximately independent distribution).
Proof of Proposition 5. This is a corollary of Proposition D.1. First, note that our
growing condition and our vanishing fraction condition imply that 2 > hL > 0 and 3 >
hT > 0. Next, let us examine the conditions that triangles are not incidentally generated.
First, the condition that links don’t generate triangles requires that 3hL > hT . Next,
the condition that triangles don’t generate triangles requires hT > 3/2 (the condition
implies that βT > (1 − (1 − βT )n−2)3 which implies βT/3 > nβT or hT/3 < hT − 1 ).
Mixtures of links and triangles not generating triangles are implied by the combination
of the two above. Finally, we have a condition that a significant fraction of links don’t
disappear into triangles is implied by hT ≥ 2 (and a way to see this directly is that degree
from triangles is order n2/nhT , which must be order constant or below). So, combining
these conditions we get the claimed intervals.
Proof of Proposition D.1.
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When obvious, we omit superscript n’s to simplify notation, but they are implicit.
Let D`(g) denote the set of all links which are deleted due to counting `′ < `:
D`(g) = {ij : ij ∈ g′, g′ ⊂ g, g′ ∈ G`′ , `′ < `}.
For instance, DL(g) is the set of links that are members of triangles that appear in g in
the links and triangles SUGM, and therefore are not considered when counting links.
Note that under our relative sparsity condition, overall link presence vanishes43, and
so it then easily follows that E[|D`(g)|] = op(n2) for any `. It follows that,
(D.2) β˜` =
S˜`(g)
κ`
(
n
m`
)
−D`(g)
= S˜`(g)
κ`
(
n
m`
)(1 + op(1))
=
 Strue`
κ`
(
n
m`
) + S˜true` − Strue`
κ`
(
n
m`
) + S˜`(g)− S˜true`
κ`
(
n
m`
)
 (1 + op(1)),
where Strue` is the number of truly generated such subgraphs (unobserved) on the whole
network, and S˜true` is the number of truly generated such subgraphs (unobserved) on
the networks that the after removing the links in D`(g), and
(
n
m`
)
counts the number
of ways to pick m` nodes out of n, and κ` is the (finite number) of relabelings to count
different subgraphs of type ` on a given set of m` nodes.44
So, we show below that |S˜true` − Strue` | = op(Strue` ) and |S˜`(g) − S˜true` | = op(S˜true` );
which then also implies that S˜`(g) − S˜true` = op(Strue` ). Together with (D.2), these tell
us that
β˜` =
 Strue`
κ`
(
n
m`
)
 (1 + op(1)).
Given that the network is growing that S`(g) has a binomial distribution with param-
eter βn0,`, parts (1) and (2) follow directly.
To see this, let us define an estimator β˜true based on the Strue:
β˜true` =
 Strue`
κ`
(
n
m`
)
 ,
noting that this is a theoretical construct since Strue is unobserved as noted above.
43This can be checked from the condition directly, or simply by noting that if it did not, then the
probability of any finite subgraph forming simply from link generation (and hence incidentally from
whatever subgraphs form a particular link) would not vanish which would contradict parts of what is
proven below.
44For example, note that κ` = 1 for a triangle but for a K-star it is K since each star is different when
a different member of the K nodes is the center.
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We know that
Σ−1/2(β˜true − βn0 ) N (0, I)
where Σ`,` =
βn0,`(1−βn0,`)
κ`( nm`)
and the off-diagonals are all 0. Then, since we have shown that
β˜ = β˜trueH, where H is a diagonal matrix with H`` = 1 + ε`, with ε` = op(1), (2) then
follows.
So, to complete the proof we show that |S˜true` −Strue` | = op(Strue` ) and |S˜`(g)− S˜true` | =
op(S˜true` ).
To establish these claims, we establish two facts. One is that the probability that some
observed subgraph of type ` was incidentally generated (by subgraphs that are no larger
than it in the ordering) is op(1). This establishes that |S˜`(g) − S˜true` | = op(S˜true` ). The
other is that a truly formed subgraph of type ` becomes part of an incidentally generated
subgraph of type `′ < ` is op(1). This establishes that |S˜true` − Strue` | = op(Strue` ).
Let zn` denote the probability that any given g′ ∈ Gn` is incidentally generated. We
now show that zn` /βn0,` = o(1), which establishes the first claim.
Consider g` ∈ Gn` and a (minimal, ordered) generating subclass C = (`j, cj)j∈J , and
for which `j ≥ ` fr all j.
We show that the probability zn` that it is generated by this subclass goes to zero
relative to βn0,`, and since there are at most M` ≤ km` such generating classes, this
implies that zn` /βn0,` → 0.
Consider a subnetwork in Gn`j . The probability of getting at least one such network
that has the cj nodes out of the m` in g` is no more than
κ`j
(
n
m`j − cj
)
βn0,`j ≤ κ`jnm`j−cjβn0,`j .
Then, we can bound the desired ratio by
zn`
βn0,`
≤
∏
j∈J n
m`j−cjκ`jβ
n
0,`j
βn0,`
≤
∏
j∈J n
m`jκ`jβ
n
0,`j
n
∑
j
cjβn0,`
≤
∏
j∈J n
m`jκ`jβ
n
0,`j
nMCnm`βn0,`
→ 0.
where the penultimate step follows from the fact that MC =
∑
j∈J cj −m` and MC ≥ 1
(since |J | ≥ 2 and some cj intersects with at least one other set of cj′ for some j′ 6= j,
as the subgraph is not just isolated pairs of links) and the final step follows from the
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sparseness condition ∏
j∈1,...,C E
[
Sn`j
]
nMCE [Sn` ]
→ 0
since the numerator of the final expression is of the order Πj∈1,...,CE(Snj ) while the de-
nominator is of the order nMCE(Sn` ).
The second claim follows from a similar calculation. It is sufficient to show that the
probability that some subgraph of type `j′ becomes part of a subgraph of type ` < `j′
(where j′ ∈ J is part of a generating class of some ` < `j′), compared to the likelihood of
the formation of a subgraph of type `j′ , is of vanishing order. Again, as there are a finite
number of larger subgraphs, and a finite number of generating classes, it is sufficient
to show this for a generic ` < `j′ and generic generating class. In the following, the
numerator is on the order of the expected number of incidentally formed subgraphs of
type ` from this type of generating class, while the denominator is the expected number
of the subgraphs of type `.
κ`
(
n
m`
)∏
j∈J n
m`j−cjκ`jβ
n
0,`j
κ`j′
(
n
mj′
)
βn0,`j′
= Θ
 ∏j∈J nm`jβn0,`j
n
∑
j=1,...,C cj−m`+m`j′ βn0,`
→ 0.
This convergence to 0 follows from the second part of the sparsity condition, which
implies that ∏
j∈1,...,C Eβn0 (S
n
`j
(g))
nMCEβn0 (S
n
`j′
(g)) → 0,
for each j′ ∈ 1, . . . , C.
